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ABSTRACT 
The lack of economic incentives and uncertainties in recovering the cost of a 
merchant / economic transmission project is an area of great concern as aging and heavy 
loading conditions limit the capability of the U.S. transmission networks.  Merchant 
transmission projects are envisioned as market based solutions to enhance the power grid and 
to import cheaper energy from power suppliers in other areas. However, due to uncertainties 
in the electric energy market, market based cost recovery mechanisms have not been 
successful in guaranteeing a full recovery of the investment. As a result, few merchant 
projects have been built. This dissertation presents a comprehensive analysis of merchant 
transmission projects and the required economic incentives that are necessary to enhance the 
power grid.  
The concept of perpetual options theory is initially introduced to analyze merchant 
transmission investment through an approved rate. Since the electric usages and the 
associated revenue are stochastic in nature, applying the perpetual options theory allows an 
investor to determine the most opportunistic time to start a transmission project and obtain 
the maximum revenue returns or let the option expire when the economic incentive is not 
sufficient. In today's environment, this decision approach is more appropriate since it 
provides transmission investors a better evaluation of its return on investment and an exit 
strategy for an investment. The probability of not recovering the capital investment 
associated with an exercise of the option to build is calculated using Kolmogorov forward 
equation. The risk of an exercise is needed for decision making of the investment and for 
assessing the incentive needed to encourage transmission investment.  
 
 viii 
A market based transmission rate is designed as an additional incentive for merchant 
projects. The new rate design provides additional revenues to transmission developers in 
order to attract the transmission investment. The rate takes into consideration the revenue 
requirement by the developer and benefits to transmission customers. Finally, a conceptual 
framework to analyze the strategic interaction between power plant investment and 
transmission line investment is proposed. The model, which is based on game theory, helps 
to evaluate different market incentives and the impact of generator's decision on transmission 
enhancement projects.  
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
The lack of economic incentives and uncertainties in recovering the cost of a 
merchant / economic transmission project is an area of great concern as the aging 
transmission infrastructure and heavy loading conditions of the U.S. transmission grids are 
worsened over the last decade. The U.S. government, industry, and research community are 
taking steps to address the issue of the lack of investment to enhance the transmission grids. 
An example of the efforts is that the 2005 Energy Policy Act directed a commission to 
develop an incentive-based rate for transmission investments. The final rule of the 
commission is expected to generate the much needed incentives to invest in transmission 
systems that will improve the system reliability and competitiveness of the energy markets. 
The final rule consists of a series of incentives that allow investors to “select and justify the 
package of incentives needed to support new investment” [1]. Other important actions have 
been pointed out by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) in a recent 
report [2]. The need to “reduce regulatory barriers and encourage investment in 
transmission” by the Federal and State regulators and the need to “engage in long-term, 
robust, and comprehensive regional planning for transmission” are two important issues 
addressed by the report.  
In general, there are two types of transmission projects: reliability and economic 
projects. Reliability projects are determined by transmission planning of the regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs) for meeting the regional reliability criteria in a specific 
planning year. These are projects that regional transmission owners (TOs) are obligated to 
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build and have a well-defined completion date as determined by the planning year in which 
they are identified. Since meeting reliability criteria is a regulatory requirement, TOs have 
been building these reliability projects and recovering the investment from the approved 
transmission rate. 
On the contrary, there is currently no obligation for a TO to build an economic project 
to import cheaper energy to serve the load serving entities (LSE) loads. Since the load may 
not be affiliated with the TO, the energy savings to the load may not be realized by the TO. 
These projects would be merchant transmission projects, and the cost recovery, at least in 
theory, would be from those who benefit from the cheaper energy. Hence, the transmission 
investment decision is based primarily on the perceived energy savings of the LSE, and the 
payment from LSEs to the project developer is likely a negotiated contract instead of a 
regulatory approved rate. Note that it is difficult to provide an accurate revenue forecast due 
to high volatility of energy prices. Furthermore, in a competitive environment, loads can 
change their suppliers. As a result, LSEs are reluctant to commit to a long-term transmission 
investment.  
Merchant transmission projects can be built at any time, depending on the economic 
conditions. A transmission investor (TI) could determine the most opportunistic time to 
invest by optimizing the transmission revenue stream over the life of the project. The TI can 
also cancel the project if the project can no longer be justified. The TI can come forward with 
the intention to build and choose when to build if the projected rate-based revenue is 
favorable. Otherwise, the investor can withdraw the intention without incurring a penalty.  
It was envisioned that merchant projects or transmission investments based on 
financial transmission rights (FTRs) are sufficient incentives for transmission investments. 
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Early work [3]-[4] showed how financial instruments can be implemented to support the 
required transmission expansion. It has been noted by [4] that, under a strong set of 
assumptions, transmission rights are able to fully recover the investment cost. However, due 
to market imperfection (e.g., market power, strategic behavior), and the fact that power flow 
follows physical laws and hence is not fully controllable, transmission costs are not fully 
recovered by financial instruments [7]. Specifically, marginal pricing fails to recover 
transmission costs. Since the investment cost may not be fully recovered, few merchant 
transmission projects have been built. Therefore, new incentives mechanisms are necessary 
to promote merchant investments, and hence have a competitive electricity market. 
The purpose of this research is to develop analytical methods for merchant 
transmission investments in order to determine the incentive mechanisms that are needed for 
enhancement of the transmission grid. To address this issue, merchant investments are 
analyzed from two different perspectives, namely: 
1. A novel investment criterion is developed based on the option theory. The criterion 
guarantees the most convenient investment time and the required economic incentives 
for a merchant project. In addition, since neither FERC nor the State commission has 
endorsed any cost recovery method at this time, the criterion and a risk assessment 
tool provides an exit strategy (abandon the option to invest) when the cost mechanism 
does not provided sufficient incentives.  
2. The second approach builds on the first approach and designs a transmission rate as 
an additional cost recovery mechanism to increase the revenues and provide the 
needed incentives for merchant projects. The transmission rate is designed based on 
market considerations rather than the traditional cost recovery method. The rate takes 
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into account transmission customers’ interest, and hence incorporates a tradeoff 
mechanism between transmission developers’ desire to increase profits and the 
benefits to customers.   
 
1.2 State of the Art of Merchant Transmission Economics 
Merchant transmission projects were intended as a market-driven solution to keep the 
system reliable and competitive [4]-[5]-[8]-[9] . However, as pointed out in [5]-[10], returns 
to scale, lumpiness, and strategic behaviors by different market participants led to an 
insufficient level of merchant project investment. Moreover, due to the fact that power flow 
follows physical laws and hence is not fully controllable, financial instruments also fail to 
recover the cost of enhancement [11]-[12]-[13]. Specifically, reference [7] shows how 
marginal pricing fails to recover transmission costs. A summary of obstacles facing merchant 
transmission investment is reported in [14]-[15]. Since the cost can not be fully recovered, 
few merchant projects have been built [1]-[16]-[70]. 
Additional economic incentives under consideration are in the areas of cost allocation  
[17]-[62], allocation of annual revenue rights/financial transmission rights [18], market 
signals for grid expansion [32]-[33], and market architecture. However, there is not a 
consensus about the proper economic incentives. 
The previous work approaches transmission investment from an institutional point of 
view, i.e., they focus on market design criteria that must incentivize transmission investment. 
Nevertheless, little research has been conducted on transmission investment from an 
investor’s point of view.  
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Capital budgeting is a research field that is concerned with the optimal allocation of 
capital resources. There exists is a vast literature on capital budgeting techniques [26]-[30]. 
For instance, [29] has become a classical reference for capital budgeting technique. From an 
investor’s point of view, merchant transmission projects must be analyzed using those 
procedures. Discounted cash flow or decision trees are capital budgeting techniques 
commonly used by investors to evaluate various projects and allocate resources on a long-
term basis. Additionally, Monte Carlo simulation is used to incorporate future uncertainties 
and quantify the associated risks of investment [30]-[71].  
Merchant projects offer a variety of challenges that do not allow a straightforward 
application of capital budgeting techniques. Specifically, uncertainties from the electricity 
market, e.g., generator bids, contingencies, other participants’ decisions, are difficult to 
model and therefore hard to incorporate into the model [51]-[64]-[67]. 
Real options have emerged as a new budgeting tool that has become a well 
established technique on investment assessment [27]-[30]-[22]-[23]. Real options take into 
account uncertainties from a variety of sources in order to evaluate a potential investment. 
Option theory has been applied to a transmission expansion project due to demand 
uncertainty [24] and, in [25], an overview of transmission expansion planning using real 
options is presented. However, the option to invest is not analyzed as an instrument of profit. 
Chapter 3 develops a technique based on option theory as a profit-seeking instrument.  
Transmission tariff is a widely cost recover mechanism used by regulated industry 
[68]-[4]. Under a vertically integrated structure, power utilities recover the capital 
investment, operational and maintenance cost through a regulated rate [4]-[56]-[63]-[64]. 
Power utilities in North America still uses transmission rates to recover the required cost 
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incurred in providing the service. In [56], a survey of transmission tariffs in North America is 
presented. According to the review, there exists a diversity of transmission design 
mechanisms. For instance, transmission owners at PJM pay for transmission enhancements 
and recover the cost through FERC-approved transmission rate; whereas each transmission 
owner in California can recover the investment via access charges and congestion charges. 
As a consequence, there is not a unified transmission rate design. 
According to economic theory, a transmission rate should send the correct 
economical signal to achieve the most efficient use of the transmission grid [59]-[60]-[61]-
[63]-[68]. It is note that LMPs provide the appropriate short term signals to use the grid but 
not the long term signals for the grid enhancement. Due to this lack of signals, various 
transmission rate mechanisms have been proposed. In [59]-[57], for instance, guidelines on 
tariff setting are provided.  
 
 
1.3 Contributions of this Dissertation 
Analysis of the merchant transmission investment has emerged as a new area of 
research in electric energy economics due to the increasing need for enhancement of the 
transmission networks in the U.S.  Over the last decades, the load on the electric power grids 
has grown steadily that is accompanied by a healthy increase in generation capacities through 
construction of new power plants. However, the transmission network has not been enhanced 
in any significant manner. This lack of transmission enhancement has led to network 
congestions and heady loading conditions.  
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Reliability driven transmission enhancement is a crucial element in enhancing the 
transmission grids. However, merchant transmission enhancement is also important for 
upgrading the capabilities of the transmission grids. As pointed out earlier, merchant 
transmission projects are motivated by the desire to bring cheaper energy from an area to 
another. Therefore, the economic analysis is needed to establish the necessary incentives that 
encourage investors to pursue these projects. The research in this dissertation is to develop 
new concepts and techniques for the merchant transmission investment. Specifically, it is 
believed that the contributions of this dissertation include:  
1. An investment evaluation technique based on real options for merchant 
transmission projects 
The technique provides an investment criterion that optimizes the random 
revenues derived from the project. The criterion also considers the fact that 
transmission investor is not obligated to build a merchant project. The analysis 
tool provides a new index for decision analysis, i.e., the waiting time that is not 
available from traditional investment techniques such as net present value or 
decision trees.  
2. A risk assessment evaluation tool that builds on the fact that revenues are 
stochastic and there is not a firm date to initiate the construction of a merchant 
project  
The assessment method provides a closed-form solution of the probability density 
function of future revenues. The closed-form offers an accurate estimate of the 
probability of not recovering the capital investment if the option to build a 
merchant project is exercised. 
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3. A new market-based transmission rate 
Transmission rate is often established based on the cost requirement rather than 
market incentives. The new rate design provides additional revenues to 
transmission developers in order to encourage the needed transmission investment. 
The rate takes into consideration the revenues requirement by the developer and 
the benefits to transmission customers.  
4. A conceptual framework to analyze the strategic iteration between power plant 
investment and transmission investment 
The framework introduces a theoretical structure to address the complex iterations 
between generation and transmission investments. The model, which is based on 
game theory, helps to evaluate different market incentives and generator’s 
decision on transmission enhancements. 
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a formulation of the 
transmission investment decision problem based on the options theory. The optimal 
investment strategy for merchant transmission projects is developed. Numerical results are 
reported at the end of the chapter. Chapter 3 extends the optimal investment criterion with a 
risk assessment tool. The probability of not recovering the capital investment before reaching 
the optimal investment criterion is developed using Kolmogorov equations. Numerical 
results demonstrate the practical applications of the proposed assessment tool. The 
comprehensive analysis of merchant investments in this research establishes new 
 
 9 
mechanisms to conduct a tradeoff between transmission customers’ interest and transmission 
investors desire to maximize profits. Chapter 4 develops a market – based transmission rate 
that can be used to reconcile the different interests. The chapter also provides a numerical 
example in order to illustrate the applicability of the proposed technique. Chapter 5 describes 
a theoretical framework to incorporate others’ decisions in the transmission investment 
analysis. A simultaneous game is designed in order to assess the impact of strategic 
interactions. Finally, the conclusions are stated in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2.  DECISION ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT 
TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT BY PERPETUAL OPTIONS THEORY 
 
2.1 Problem Formulation 
Consider a power market where merchant transmission projects are already identified 
by a Transmission Investor (TI). The proposed perpetual option formulation provides an 
investor with the option, but not the obligation, to build any or all of these new merchant 
projects at any time without a firm commitment date or an expiration date. 
Knowing how the revenues are collected by the ISO or RTO, the time at which the 
option should be exercised can be established based on maximization of the expected 
revenues over the cost recovery period. 
Consider a simple example using a commonly approved rate design employed in the 
US power industry. An annual rate (AR) is computed based on the highest one coincident 
peak (1CP) of the zone and the total capital investment. The 1CP formulation is used to 
illustrate how a simple cost recovery mechanism is able to incentivize transmission 
investment if transmission cost can be fully recovered. The 1CP formulation has also been 
allowed by FERC and therefore is used in this paper. Specifically, in planning the system, the 
expansions and reinforcements identified at peak load are the Transmission Owner's 
obligations to build to meet the reliability standards and criteria. The philosophy is that a 
system must be able to reliably serve its peak load. Otherwise, the reliability of the system 
might be compromised. NERC reliability standards and criteria are designed for planning the 
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system at peak load. Since the peak load is the benchmark for transmission reinforcements, 
the peak load is used to determine the transmission rate. 
Specifically, the AR (in $/MW-year) is determined by dividing the annual revenue 
requirement (a percentage of the total transmission cost) by the highest coincident peak of a 
transmission zone. The daily revenue due to daily peak demand is denoted R1(t) and can be 
determined as 
 
 1( ) ( ) 365
ARR t DDV t ⎛= ×⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  (1) 
 
where DDV(t) is a Daily coincident peak Demand Value. The daily peak demand is 
used, instead of hourly energy charges, in order to simplify the discussion. 
Note that the proposed method can incorporate the financial instruments such as 
transmission rights that are awarded to TI as an added incentive once the project is in 
operation. Although the main cost recovery mechanism proposed in this research is still 
based on (1), transmission rights can be included in the formulation in order to evaluate the 
potential impact of such an added financial incentive. With revenues from the transmission 
rate and from the transmission rights, the total daily revenues collected by a TI are given by 
 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( )R t R t R t= +  (2) 
 
where R(t) denotes the total daily revenues, R1(t) revenues due to a transmission rate, 
and R2(t) revenues due to transmission rights. Because of the random nature of the daily 
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demand and nodal prices, the total daily revenues R(t), R1(t) and R2(t) are all stochastic. As a 
result, the value of the return from the project is also stochastic. Note that (2) takes into 
account uncertainty from energy demand (R1(t)) and market operation (R2(t)), i.e., bidding 
strategy, fuel cost, and generally all market uncertainties are captured by nodal prices that 
dictate the revenue from the transmission rights. 
The proposed formulation can be simplified when revenues come from only one 
source, either transmission rate or transmission rights. For example, if only a regulatory 
approved rate is allowed to recover the transmission investment cost, the second term of (2) 
(R2(t)) will be zero. Alternatively, if financial instrument is the only recovery mechanism, the 
first term will be zero. 
Options are financial instruments for profit seeking and risk management. Perpetual 
options are options without an expiration date. When a perpetual option is exercised, an 
investor is obligated to a financial agreement, which, in the context of this research, is to 
invest in a merchant transmission project. 
An option to invest should be exercised when the present value of the expected 
revenue collected over the recovery period minus the investment cost is maximized. The 
corresponding optimal time to exercise the option is denoted by Ti. Due to the waiting time 
Ti, the total revenues need to be discounted over time. The expected value of revenues is 
calculated over an interval from the exercise time Ti to the end of the cost recovery period TF, 
that is,  
 
 
F
i
i
T
Tt
T
E Re dt e ρρ −−
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  (3) 
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where E ⋅  denotes the expected value, and ρ  is a discount rate. In (3), revenues to 
be collected between Ti and Tf  are discounted back to the initial time Ti with the discount 
factor ρ , which can represent inflation, etc. during that period. The integral, i.e., the total 
discounted revenues collected within Ti and Tf, is discounted from Ti to To with the same 
discount factor. Note that To is the present time. 
 
Hold the option
(Waiting Time)
Exercise the option
(Reach the optimal
value: R*)
To Ti Tf
time
End of  cost
recovery period
Cost recovery
period (Tc)
R
R*
Ro
 
Figure 1. A realization of random revenues and the waiting time 
 
An optimal exercise revenue ( *R ) is reached at time Ti when E ⋅  is maximized. It is 
assumed that an investor can begin to recover the investment as soon as the option is 
exercised. Specifically, the revenue during the construction period is collected under the 
Allowances for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC). Fig. 1 illustrates the random 
nature of revenues over the waiting and cost recovery periods of the option. Although 
revenues are not collected over the holding period, they can be observed through the 
forecasted AR , peak demands and nodal prices. 
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It is seen that the end of the holding period, Ti, in Fig. 1 is the first time for the 
revenue to reach the optimal value *R . Since R  is random, Ti is not a deterministic value. 
This paper proposes a strategy to compute the optimal revenue value *R and the waiting time. 
The waiting time is described by a cumulative distribution function (CDF). It is assumed that 
(2) is used for cost recovery over the time period between Ti and Tf.  
 
2.2 Investment Decision Time: A Deterministic Approach 
A common industry approach to recovering the investment is to develop an annual 
revenue requirement and its associated fixed rate based on the capital cost of the project and 
forecasted load. A Transmission Owner (TO) then uses this FERC approved rate to recover 
the investment. If the actual load is lower than the forecasted load, a TO can file a rate case 
in hope of getting a higher rate to make up for the difference. However, in today’s regulatory 
environment, there is no guarantee that a higher rate will be approved.  
Assume that the decision can wait. An approach that reflects the industry practice is 
given here. The method can be used to determine a corresponding waiting time and cost 
recovery based on the 1CP rate design.  
1. Establishing an annual revenue requirement denoted as RR ($ / year) based on the 
capital investment, rate of return, inflation, taxes, and depreciation, O&M 
expenses, etc. 
2. Setting up 1CP rate formula as the cost recovery mechanisms given by yearly rate 
AR RR H=  ($ / kW / year) or daily rate 365AR RR H=  ($ / kW / day). H 
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represents the most recent single highest coincidence peak of the zone in 
kilowatts. 
3. Forecasting the load throughout the life of the project. 
4. Determining the waiting time that is computed based on the present value of the 
revenues over the cost recovery period discounted at a rate ρ . The present value 
 of the stream of revenues over the cost recovery period is give by PV
 
 
11
1
(1 ) 1
24 1
nnTc
n
RR F xPV
H ρ
−−
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑  (4) 
 
where F is the forecasted total annual energy in kW-hour and x is the percentage of 
load growth. In (4), the present value is the summation of the discounted revenues over the 
cost recovery period Tc. For each year, the discounted revenue is the annual rate AR times the 
forecasted annual energy, which is the second term of the expression inside the summation, 
and the discount factor (the third term) that brings the value of the revenue of that year to the 
present time. 
The over the project life will be compared to the capital investment. If the capital 
investment is not fully recovered, the project should be moved one year later, i.e., equation 
(4) is computed from to
PV
2n = 1cn T= + . The investment decision year will be when the 
present value of the decision year is equal to the capital investment at the same year taking 
inflation into account. Since load is a random variable, the revenue may be over- or under-
collected. As a result, there is no assurance that the cost will be fully recovered. The waiting 
time obtained from the methods described in sections II and III will be compared later.   
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2.3 Investment Decision Time: Perpetual Option Approach 
 An outline of the procedure for finding the optimal value R* and the waiting time 
using the options approach is as follows: 
1. Establish a mathematical model that best fits the behavior of R over time. 
2. Establish the optimal revenue condition R* where the option is exercised.  
3. Based on the optimal condition R*, the CDF of the waiting time is obtained by 
computer simulation of a large number of realizations of R. 
 
2.3.1 Revenue Model 
A stochastic model for the revenue R is needed, which, based on (2), is determined by 
DDV, AR, and transmission rights. A time series from the historical data can be used to 
identify a mathematical model that better fits the time series. Specifically, a stochastic 
process is required. Various stochastic processes (e.g., a Brownian motion, Mean Reverting 
Process) may be suitable to model the time series. However, this study identifies a special 
case of the generalized Wiener process, or Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) [22]-[23]-
[26], as the best suited for the following reasons: 
 
1. GBM captures the non-negative characteristic of the revenues, i.e., equation (1) 
and (2) only have positive values over time. Other stochastic processes such as 
Brownian Motion (BM) and Mean Reverting Process (MRP) are not considered 
since they allow having negative and positive values over time.  
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2. GBM captures the fact that the daily revenue is expected to increase over time. 
This is a consequence of the increment of DDV. MRP tends to approach a 
stationary non-increasing value in the long run.  
3. GBM allows a closed form for R* and simplifies the analysis and computation.   
 
The mathematical representation of a GBM is given by  
 
 ( )
( )
dR t dt dz
R t
μ σ= +  (5) 
 
where μ  is the annualized expected return of revenues, σ  is the annualized volatility 
of the revenues, and  is a standard Wiener process given by dz dz dtε=  with (0,1)Nε ∼ , 
which represents a normal distribution with 0 mean and 1 standard deviation. Note that (5) 
describes how revenue evolves over time, i.e., the continuous-time version of ( )R t . 
However, ( )R t at a future time t is a random variable whose distribution is given by [27]
 
 
2
ln ( ) ~ ln ,
2o
R t N R t tσμ σ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎟⎟
 (6) 
 
where ln ( )R t  is the natural log of revenues, and oR  represents the initial value of the 
revenues as shown in Fig. 1. The present value when revenues are described by (5) is 
different from the PV described in (4). GBM provides a closed form to calculate the present 
value of expected future revenues from a time To to infinity, i.e., [24] 
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 0( ) ( )
o
o
T
RPV T E R e dρττ τ ρ μ
∞
−= = −∫  (7) 
 
2.3.2 The Optimal Revenue Condition or Optimal Investment Value 
An investment would be more attractive if one is able to wait and make investment 
decision after new and favorable information arrives. An investment is less risky if one can 
forgo the commitment when the information is unfavorable.  Having the opportunity to wait 
for new information such as load tendency, market operation, regulatory approved rate 
designs, etc. adds monetary value to an option. Similar to holding a stock option, there is an 
opportunity cost or investment opportunity associated with the option. Hence, in applying the 
option theory, the total investment cost should include the capital cost of the project and this 
opportunity cost.  
Let represent the value of the option to investment. For this research, the  
is a function of the revenues implying that future uncertainties are fully captured by
( )F R ( )F R
R . Other 
sources of uncertainties such as contingencies, and market planning, are neglected for this 
study. The total investment cost is then ( )F R K+  where  represents the capital 
investment. A TI can exercise the option when the expected revenues of the project are 
greater than the total investment cost. The investment opportunity is defined as the maximum 
expected value of revenues when the option is exercised at an unknown future time T subject 
to (5) 
K
[22]-[23]. 
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 ( ) max ( ) TTTF R E R K e
ρ−= −  (8) 
 
where TR  is the present value of the revenues when the option is exercised at T. 
Equation (8) implies that an investment opportunity is the maximum expected present value 
of the net payoffs.       
The decision problem proposed here is to find an optimal value *R such 
that * *( ) ( )F R K R ρ μ+ = − , i.e., when the total investment cots is equal to the expected 
future revenues of the project. Note that the proposed approach is an extension of the 
conventional Net Present Value analysis in which the NPV of the total investment cost must 
be at least equal to the PV of the revenue generated by the project.   
To solve the optimization problem of (8), a differential equation that related (5) and 
(8) is established using option theory or dynamic programming and is given by [22]-[23]
 
 2 21 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
R F R RF R F Rσ ρ δ ρ+ − −  =  (9) 
 
Equation (9) is a second order differential equation where δ ρ μ= − , and satisfies the 
follow boundary conditions:  
 
 (0) 0F =  (10) 
 
*
*( ) RF R Kρ μ= −−  (11) 
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 * 1( )F R ρ μ= −  (12) 
 
Equation (10) indicates that the investment opportunity is zero when there is no 
revenue. As mentioned in Section 2, *R is the optimal value when the condition to exercise 
the option is met and the total investment cost ( ( ) )F R K+  is equal to the present value of 
revenues (11). Equation (12) implies that the slope of  is equal to the slope of (7) at the 
optimal value. Taking into account all boundary conditions, the solution of 
( )F R
(9) is given by  
 
 ( )F R ARβ=  (13) 
where 
 
1
2 2
2 2 2
1 ( ) ( ) 1 2 1
2 2
ρ δ ρ δ ρβ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞= − + − + >⎜⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (14) 
 * ( )
1
R Kβρ μ β
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  (15)  
 ( ) 1*
1
( )
A
R
βρ μ β −
=
−
 (16) 
Note that  is a monotonic convex function. The maximum value is given when 
the slope of (12) matches the slope of the net present value (7), i.e., boundary condition (12). 
Note that the net expected present values (7) is less than  for values for 
( )F R
( )F R *R R≤ . 
*R is the first time at which the revenue reaches the optimal value. Since R  is a 
random process, it is possible for the revenue to fall back below the optimal value at a future 
time. However, the random process model here, Eq. (5), is Geometric Brownian Motion 
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(GBM) with a “drift” μ , which means that the expected value of the revenue will increase 
over time at the rate of μ . Hence, although the revenue may fall again for some realizations 
of the random process, the general trend is to move up again and therefore, the optimal 
condition is still met. 
 
2.3.3 The Waiting Time 
The waiting time Ti is defined as the time when the optimal value *R is reached for 
the first time. Due to the stochastic nature of the revenues, the waiting time is a random 
variable whose cumulative distribution function is given by 
 
 *( ) { }
iT i
CDF t P T t*= ≤  (17) 
 
where  denotes the probability of reaching the optimal value at or before . Note 
that the CDF of the waiting time depends on the initial value
*( )
iT
CDF t *t
oR as it is indicated in Fig. 1. 
Different initial values oR  lead to different CDFs. Higher values imply a shorter waiting time 
since oR  is closer to the target value 
*R . In this study, the CDFs are obtained for a large 
number of realizations of (5) by simulations. The proposed simulation method consists of 
repeated simulations of (5) over the same time interval and records the value of t where the 
optimal value *R is reached for the first time. 
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2.4 Numerical Results 
A 5 bus system is used for the case study to illustrate the proposed methodology. Fig. 
2 shows a potential merchant project according to TI or RTO economic analysis. 
 
G1 G2 LSE 1 LSE 2
LSE 3
G3
G4G5
1 2 3
4
5 Merchant
Project
Zone
 
Figure 2. A merchant project in a 5 bus system 
 
For illustration purpose, assume that the project shown in Fig. 2 is worth $150M and 
the annual revenues requirement, RR, is about 16% of the project or $24M. Note that 
economic factors such as inflation, depreciation and taxes can be incorporated into the annual 
rate calculation. Specifically, the annual rate here is determined based on the capital 
investment, rate of return, depreciation, O & M expenses, etc. When all these economic 
factors are considered, the annual revenue requirement is roughly 16% of the capital cost 
based on industry experience. The highest daily peak value of Zone 1 in Fig. 2 is assumed to 
be 4100 MW. The cost recovery period is assumed to be 40 years, and the yearly and daily 
annual transmission rate, respectively, based on 1CP formula rate are given by  
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624 10 $5,853.66  
4100 MW - year
5,853.66 $16.037 
365 MW - day
RRAR
H
AR
⎡ ⎤×= = = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (18) 
 
Fig. 3 shows the hypothetical historical revenues from daily demand and transmission 
rights. The sum of R1(t) and R2(t) corresponds to the total revenues R(t), which is used to 
compute GBM parameters. R1(t) is based on (1), i.e., historical daily peak demand multiplied 
by the daily rate in (18). R1(t) exhibits a seasonal behavior as can be seen in Fig. 3. On the 
other hand, revenues from transmission rights exhibit steadily increment that reflects their 
values due to differences in Locational Marginal Prices from system congestion. Since the 
result shows that the total revenues consist mainly of transmission rate revenues, it can be 
argued that transmission rate could provide adequate return of investment and the necessary 
incentive to build these projects.  Other benefit from rate based recovery is that the risk 
coming from strategic planning of different participants is reduced, i.e., other’s decision, 
which affects nodal prices and thus transmission revenues, are not taken into account. 
Additionally, the cost recovery of one project is not a function of the others’ projects under 
the rate structure. Therefore, multiple projects can be evaluated by the Regional 
Transmission Organization separately. 
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Figure 3. Historical Daily peak Demand Value (DDV) and transmission rights 
 
The data shown in Fig. 3 are used to forecast future daily revenues. The parameters 
μ  and σ of (5) that fits the summer peak values are found using maximum likelihood 
estimation [27]. Only summer peak values are taken into account for parameter estimation 
because they normally exhibit high volatility and more uncertainty. The annualized expected 
return of revenues μ  is 0.1095 and the annualized volatility σ  is 0.1043. Having the GBM 
parameters and assuming a discount rate ρ  of 13%, the optimal value when the option must 
be exercised based on (13)-(14) is  * $20.460M R =
The revenue R0 at time To in Fig. 1 is based on the 1CP rate, daily peak demand value 
and revenue due to transmission rights. The peak demand value at To is assumed to be 
4100MW (the highest daily peak demand value) so that the revenue R1(t) at To is given by 
R1(To)=16.037×4100=$65,751. Similarly, revenues form the transmission right at To are 
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assumed to be 10% of the revenues caused by the peak demand, i.e., R2(To)=$6,575. 
Together, the total revenues at To is R(To)= R0=$72,326. 
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Figure 4. CDF of the waiting time. R0=$72,326 
 
The CDF of the waiting time is shown in Fig. 4. The horizontal axis represents time 
in years and the vertical axis represents the probability. The CDF is computed based on 5,000 
realizations of (5) over a time horizon of 100 years. The time when a realization reaches 
the optimal investment value of for the first time is recorded for each 
realization. Based on the recorded times, the CDF of the waiting time (16) is obtained, which 
gives the probability for the (random) revenue 
*t
* $20.460M R =
R  to reach *R at or before time t . As shown in 
Fig. 4, it takes almost 85 years for the probability to approach 1. Note that a long waiting 
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time does not encourage transmission investment. Therefore, an incentive to encourage 
transmission investment is needed, and thus reduces the waiting time. 
Assume that the merchant transmission project has an initial incentive. The incentive 
is assumed to be a percentage of the capital investment that comes from allowance provided 
by the FERC. The rest of the investment cost is recovered by the proposed cost recovery 
mechanisms, i.e., using daily demand and transmission rights. Different initial values of R0 
are considered in order to evaluate sensitivity of the waiting time with respect to initial 
incentive R0. Three initial incentive values are used, i.e., 8%, 10%, and 12% of the capital 
investment ($150M). Note that the optimal value *R does not depend on the initial value R0. 
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Figure 5. CDFs of the waiting time. Three different initial incentives 
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The CDF of the waiting time is shown in Fig. 5. Each curve is the CDF for a different 
initial value of Ro. The dashed lines represent the CDF when total revenues include 
transmission revenues. On the other hand, continuous lines are the CDFs when revenues do 
not include transmission rights, i.e., 2 ( ) 0R t = . When transmission rights are considered, the 
optimal value *R is likely to be reached at Year 3, Year 7, Year 13, for an initial incentive of 
$18M, $15M, and $12M, respectively. The left curve corresponds to the shortest waiting 
time which has the highest incentive ($18M). On the other hand, a lower incentive ($12M) 
leads to a longer waiting time as shown in the right curve. Note that the slope of the CDF 
represents the probability density of the waiting time at that point. Therefore, Year 3, Year 7 
and Year 13 have high probability densities. The CDFs rise sharply at Year 3, Year 7 and 
Year 13. Note that the effect of having transmission rights is to decrease the waiting time. 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the CDFs of the present value of revenues collected over the 
cost recovery period once the option is exercised, i.e., equation (2) for Ti=3, Ti=7 and Ti=13. 
The horizontal axis represents revenues in millions and the vertical axis represents 
probability. Dashed lines represent the CDF when transmission rights are included as a part 
of the cost recovery mechanism. On the other hand, continuous lines represent cases without 
transmission rights. A total of 5,000 realizations of (5) are computed for a time horizon of 40 
years, i.e., the cost recovery period. All realizations have the same starting value of *R . The 
present value of the revenue collected over Tc is recorded for each realization, i.e., each 
realization is a collection of daily revenues that are all discounted at 13%ρ = .  
A straight vertical line on the left side indicates the value of the capital investment 
and a return of 12%, i.e., $168M. Note that this is a deterministic value and hence it is a 
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straight line. Although the option is exercised at the optimal point *R , there is still a risk of 
not recovering the cost due to an unexpected decrement of the revenues as a consequence of 
a decrement of demand or revenues from transmission rights. The reason is that the method 
only provides the best estimate that the investment can be fully recovered but there is no 
guarantee that it will be the case due to market and demand uncertainties. 
The risk of not recovering the capital investment and a 12% rate of return is given by 
the intersection of the vertical line with each CDF. Indeed, the probability that the cost of 
$168M will not be recovered for the case of Ro=12M (Fig. 6) is 0.25 when transmission 
rights are included and 0.64 without transmission rights. That is, the probability to recover 
the cost is 0.75 and 0.36 respectively. 
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Figure 6. CDFs of revenues. Ro=$12M 
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Figure 7. CDFs of revenues. Ro=$15M and Ro=$18M 
 
Fig. 7 shows the CDFs corresponding to Ro = $18M and Ro = $15M. The curve of Ro 
= $18M is able to recover the investment cost; the probability to recover the cost is 0.99. It 
implies that revenues based mainly on a fixed annual rate AR and peak daily demand values 
are sufficient as a cost recover mechanism. This greatly reduces the risk of a rate case 
revision. Note that allowing for the added revenue from the transmission rights decreases the 
waiting time and the risk of not recovering the capital investment for projects. However, if a 
high initial incentive is allowed, the rate based cost recovery method would be sufficient to 
encourage merchant projects without the added return from transmission rights as seen in 
Fig. 5 and Fig. 7. 
Finally, in order to compare the option approach with the industry practice, the same 
merchant project is analyzed. Capital investment ($150M), annual revenue requirement (RR), 
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the annual transmission rate (AR), and the discount rate are the same. Load growth, x, 
inflation rate, and the forecasted total annual energy, F are 3%, 4%, and 1,000 MW-hr, 
respectively. Based on the industry practice described in section III, it is established that the 
merchant project should be built 8 year from the current date, i.e., the present value of 
forecasted revenues given by (4) at Year 8 is equal to the capital investment with 12% of 
return.   
For comparison, assume that the initial incentive of 10% ($15M) is provided, no 
transmission rights are considered, and the option approach is used. The optimal value is 
likely to be reached at Year 8 according to Fig. 5. The CDF of revenues given in Fig. 7 is 
reproduced in Fig. 8. The deterministic investment time (8 years) is closed to the most likely 
value of the waiting time in Fig. 5. Note that the option approach allows an investor to take 
into account the random nature of revenues in the decision making process. In contrast, the 
deterministic approach does not model the stochastic revenues and the risk level is not 
quantified. Using the option approach, it is obtained that the probability to recover the cost is 
0.86, as shown in Fig. 7.  
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Figure 8. Revenue comparison between an option exercised at Year 8 and forecasted 
revenue based on industry practice 
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CHAPTER 3. RISK CALCULATION OF MERCHANT TRANSMISSION 
PROJECT USING KOLMOGOROV EQUATIONS 
 
3.1 Problem Formulation 
For a merchant transmission project, a TI can estimate the most opportunistic time to 
make the investment since merchant transmission projects do not have a firm commitment or 
completion date. In contrast, a reliability project has a definite commissioning date since it is 
needed to mitigate the reliability criteria violation by the transmission planner for a specific 
planning year.   
The market rule for recovering merchant transmission investment varies from one 
market to another depending on whether the merchant project is rated based or market based. 
For example, merchant projects at PJM are likely to be rate based and the investment of these 
economic projects would be recovered by the FERC approved fixed transmission rate or a 
formula rate. In this chapter, a 1CP fixed annual network integration transmission service 
rate, denoted by T, in dollars / mega-watt-year [$/MW-year] is assumed as a cost recovery 
mechanism. Note that the assumed cost recovery mechanism is the same as chapter 2. Other 
cost recovery mechanisms such as incremental financial transmission rights or a two party 
transaction fee can also be used in the proposed approach. The 1CP network transmission 
service rate is calculated by the ratio of the annual revenue requirement of the investment to 
the zone’s coincidental peak load. Having the transmission rate, a daily charge (R) is 
 
 33 
collected by the ISO based on a daily demand value (D) coincident with the annual peak of 
the zone, i.e.,   
 
 * / 365R D T=  (19) 
 
A monthly payment is made to the TI that is the sum of the daily values over all days 
of the month. Note that daily revenues R are stochastic due to the random nature of the D (i.e. 
the daily demands). Consequently, the value of the project defined as the present value of 
future cash flow is also stochastic.  Equation (1) is similar to the daily charges collected by 
PJM using a network transmission service rate [39]. 
Perpetual option theory provides an investment criterion for projects whose revenues 
are stochastic. Since these projects do not have a specific time to start the construction, 
perpetual refers to the fact that the option to invest does not have an expiration time. Since 
the cost recovery mechanism defined by (19) is stochastic and the TI has no obligation to 
invest in the project, the theory provides an investment criterion that maximizes the expected 
present value of the revenues over the cost recovery period. As in the net present value 
technique, the options theory establishes an optimal value of revenues R* at which the 
investor should exercise the option to invest. However, the capital investment might not be 
fully recovered due to uncertainties in the demand and hence, the revenues. As a result, the 
theory only provides the optimal expected return with no guarantee to fully recover the 
capital investment. 
Once the option is exercised, the cumulative distribution function of the present value 
of daily revenues over the cost recovery period is used to calculate the probability of not 
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recovering the cost of investment. The distribution is obtained using a large number of Monte 
Carlo simulations. Fig. 9 shows a hypothetical cumulative distribution function of the present 
value PV of the daily revenues R, i.e., PV(R). The vertical straight line is the capital 
investment K of the merchant project. K is a deterministic value represented as a straight line. 
The intersection of the CDF and the straight line is the probability that PV(R) is less than or 
equal to K., i.e., P( PV(R) ≤  K ). Note that P( PV(R) ≤  K ) can also be computed directly 
from the Probability Density Function (PDF) if a closed form is provided. 
 
 
Figure 9. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the present value of the daily 
revenues PV(R) 
 
It was mentioned that the option to invest can be exercised before the optimal value 
R* is reached, i.e., an early exercise might be desirable if enough incentives are provided by 
the market regulators. Examples of such incentives are allowances approved by FERC, 
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incentive adder to the rate of return on the investment, incremental financial transmission 
rights, etc. The probability of not recovering the capital investment before the optimal value 
is reached can be calculated using the PDF or CDF of the present value of the total revenues 
given that the option is exercised before R*. Having the capital investment K and the 
conditional PDF or CDF, the probability can be determined and used for making an 
investment decision. The next section explains how a condition PDF is obtained for a 
merchant project whose revenues are stochastic. 
 
3.2 Early Exercise: A Quantitative Analysis 
 
In this paper, daily revenues R described by (19) is modeled as Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM), i.e., the randomness of the daily revenue is captured by a Brownian motion.  
Chapter 2 provides a qualitative argument for the use of a GMB model when R is given by. 
The GBM model is given by (20) 
 
 dR dt dz
R
μ σ= +  (20) 
 
where μ is the annualized drift of the revenues, σ is the annualized variance, and dz is 
a Wiener process: dz dtε= with ~ (0,1)Nε  where ε symbolizes a normal distribution with 
0 mean and 1 standard deviation. With a GBM model, it is possible to obtain a closed form 
solution of the optimal investment criterion R*  that is given by (21). Derivation of the 
optimal criterion can be found in [23].  
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 * ( )
1
R Kβρ μ β
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  (21) 
 
where  ρ is the annual discount rate of future revenues. The parameter β  is given by 
 
 
1
2 2
2 2 2
1 1
2 2
μ μ ρβ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − + − +⎜⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
2 ⎟⎟  (22) 
 
An illustration of the optimal investment criterion R* is shown in Fig. 10. A 
comparison with traditional Net Present Value (NPV) criterion is shown in order to illustrate 
the significance of R*. The straight line in Fig. 10 corresponds to the net present value. It is 
used only for illustrative purpose. The net present value is given by 
 
 ( ) dNPV R R Kρ= −  (23) 
 
where ρd is the daily discount rate, and M is the investment criterion given by NPV. 
The investment criterion is the solution of (23), i.e., NPV(R)=0. According to the NPV rule, 
the TI should invest if the NPV is greater or equal to M.  
 
On the other hand, the value of the option to invest in a project when the daily 
revenues follows (20) is denoted as F(R), and corresponds to the convex curve in Fig. 10. 
The optimal invest criterion R* when revenues are given by (20) and corresponds to the 
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tangent point between F(R) and NPV(R). Since β is greater than 1, and assuming that µ ≥ ρ, 
the optimal investment value R* is greater than M according to (23). An interpretation of the 
results is that uncertainties from revenues would prevent a transmission investor to invest in 
the project. As a consequence, a higher return on the capital investment is required by 
investors or the investment decision is delayed until some uncertainty is resolved.  
 
 
F(R)
NPV(R) 
M R*
F(R) 
NPV(R)
R 
-K 
 
Figure 10.  A comparison between the optimal investment criterion ( R* ) provided by 
perpetual option theory and the investment criterion ( M ) provided by the net present 
value rule 
 
The probability of not recovering the capital investment when the option is exercised 
for values between *M R R≤ ≤ can be calculated using Kolmogorov forward equation. These 
are the transition probabilities which could be used to judge and make decision based on the 
likelihood of recovering the investment. Note that the option to invest is never exercised for 
values lower than M because it implies negative NPV implying that the capital investment 
may not be fully recovered.  
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To calculate the transition probabilities, the value of the project ( V ) is defined as the 
present value of the future revenues, i.e., V = PV( R ). By Ito’s Lemma [22], it can be shown 
that V follows a GBM if R is given by (20), i.e., V is described as v vdV V dt dzμ σ= +  where 
μv is the annualized drift of the value of the project, and σv is the annualized variance of the 
value of the project. In other words, μv is the expected annual increment of the present value 
of the revenues and σv the volatility. Since V and R follow the same stochastic process, the 
comparison of Fig. 10 can be done in terms of V as well.   
The transition probability, denoted as ( )1, | ,ot oV t V tφ , is a probability density function 
of the values of the project at t1 given that the current value is Vto. A graphical interpretation 
of the transition probability is shown in Fig. 11. The x axis represents time, y the value of the 
project, and z probability. Fig. 11 shows a sample realization of V over time, i.e., V(t). V* 
denotes the optimal investment value in terms of the project value. The optimal value of the 
project can be derived from (21) and is given by ( )( )* 1v vV β β= − K
)o
 where βv is given by 
(22) replacing μ and σ  by μv and σv respectively.  
The shadow area indicates the probability that the future value of the project is equal 
to or less than the capital investment K given that the current value of the project is Vto.. 
Mathematically, 
 
  (24) (1 1( , | , ) , | ,o Kt o t oP V K t V t y t V t dyφ
−∞
≤ = ∫
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A closed form for the transition probability can be obtained using Kolmogorov 
forward equations [22] - [40]. The closed form is possible based on the assumption that the 
daily revenues and the project value follow a GBM. The transition probability is given by 
[40]
 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
22
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, | ,
1 1exp log 2
22 ( )
o
o
t o
t v v
vv o
V t V t
V V t t
t tV t t
φ
μ σσσ π
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎣ ⎦−− ⎝ ⎠
 (25) 
 
According to (25), the transition probability depends on the parameters of the GBM 
process μv, σv and the difference between the current time t0 and the future t1. The next 
section will compute various transitions probability for future time values. 
 
t
p
V
P( V ≤ K | Vt0 , t 0  )
K
Vt0
V*
Φ( V,  t1 | Vt0 , t0  )
V(t)
t1t0  
Figure 11. Transition probability 
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3.3 Numerical Results 
3.3.1 Project Description and the Value of the Option 
Consider that the revenues of a rate base transmission project follow a GBM process. 
The parameters of R are estimated based on historical daily peak demand values, 
transmission rate and the cost recovery proposed by (1). Having the GBM parameter, μv and 
σv are estimated using Ito’s Lemma. Assume for simplicity that the annual drift and the 
annual standard deviation of the value of the merchant project are µv = 0.05 and σv = 0.1 
respectively. The drift represents the expected increment of future cash flows when there is 
no uncertainty. The value of the merchant project is therefore expected to increase 5% every 
year. The standard deviation is a measure of the uncertainty in future cash flows, i.e., 
volatility. The capital investment of the merchant project is K=$150 million, and the discount 
rate of future cash flows is ρ=10%.  
Having the GBM parameters and the discount rate, the optimal investment value is V* 
=2.1844 × K = $327.66 millions according to (21) and (22). Fig. 12 shows the value of the 
option F(V) and the net present value NPV(V) as a function of the value of the project V. The 
tangent point gives the optimal investment value. Note that V* ≥ M. Fig. 12 shows that the 
net present value rule could underestimates the investment because the criterion provided by 
net present value rule ignores uncertainty from future revenues. In contrast, the optimal 
criterion V* is higher than M as a consequence of the uncertainty in future cash flows. Note 
that the effect of a higher investment criterion entails a longer waiting time, i.e., the TI has to 
postpone the investment even though the present value exceeds the capital investment. This 
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extra time translates in higher return and is beneficial to the TI. It gives an additional time to 
evaluate the return from the electricity market and thus make a better investment decision. 
 
 
Figure 12. A comparison of the value of the option F(V) and the net present value 
NPV(V) 
 
The difference between M and V* is given by the parameters of the stochastic process 
and the discount rate. For instance, a project with higher volatility implies higher standard 
deviation. If the standard deviation is increased to 15%, the optimal value is V* = 2.3844 × 
K = $358.076 million. This value is higher than the optimal investment value with a lower 
standard deviation. High optimal investment values imply that revenues are more volatile. As 
a result, the TI will demand a higher rate of return on the investment. Fig. 13 shows the 
relation between the standard deviation and the investment criterion V*.  The figure confirms 
that additional uncertainty raises the optimal investment value. In order to promote 
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transmission investment, additional incentives may be needed to compensate for the 
uncertainty. 
 
Figure 13. Optimal investment value V* as a function of the standard deviation 
 
 
3.3.2 Risk Assessment: Conditional Probability Approach 
Figure 14 shows the probability of not able to recover the capital investment K at 
future time even when net present value is positive, i.e., NPV  = Vto  – K = $160M  -$150M  
= $10 M. The horizontal axis in Fig. 14 represents time in Years and the vertical axis 
probability.  Equation (24) and (25) are evaluated for different values of t1. Take for instance 
t1=2. Equation (25) gives the transition probability of the values of the project at t1=2. The 
transition probability at t1=2 is a conditional PDF of the value of the project given that the 
current value is Vto=$ 160M.  The probability that the value of the project at t1=2 is less than 
or equal to the capital investment K = $150M is 0.137 according to Fig. 14. Hence, it is 
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likely that the project will recover the capital investment in two years. Note that this 
probability is computed for values at t1. Note that Fig. 14 corresponds to associated risk of an 
early exercise because the current value Vto is lower than V*. 
The conditional probability generally decreases over time due to the assumption of 
the mathematical model assumed. According to (20), daily revenues (or the value of the 
project) increase over time because of the expected increment of daily peak demand values. 
As a result, the risk of not recovering the investment is expected to decrease as the model 
suggests. For instance, the conditional probability is roughly 0.08 at t1=6. That means the 
risk of not recovering the capital at t1=6 is roughly 0.08 when the option to invest is 
exercised at Vto= $160M. 
  
 
 
Figure 14. Risk assessment of an early exercise before the optimal investment value V*= 
$327.66 
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Figure 15 shows the value of the conditional probability for different values of Vto 
evaluated at different times. The x and y axes represent time and the value of the project 
respectively. The axis z is the conditional probability. The current value of the project is the 
value at which the option can be exercised. Note that all the values are lower than the optimal 
investment value V * = $327.66M.   
 
 
Figure 15. Risk assessment of an early exercise for different values of Vto
 
Three different scenarios are analyzed. Take for instance a value of Vto= $50M. 
According to Fig. 12, the net present value is negative and the investor should not invest. The 
conditional probability of a project whose current value is Vto= $50M shows that the risk of 
not recovering the capital investment slightly decreases over time. It remains above 0.6 at 
year 20. In other words, it is unlikely that the value of the project at year twenty will be 
greater or equal to the capital investment. For this scenario, the net present value criterion 
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and an early exercise clearly suggest that the investment is not profitable. Consider an 
optimistic scenario where the value of the project is Vto= $200M. This value exceeds the 
capital investment. The net present value is positive according to Fig. 11 and therefore the 
investor should invest. The same conclusion can be drawn from the conditional probability. 
Fig. 15 verifies that for a value of Vto= $200M the conditional probability is lower than 0.01 
at t1 = 1. Since the conditional probability is expected to decrease according to Fig. 14, it is 
highly likely that the capital investment will be recovered. For this case, the net present value 
rule and the conditional probability lead to the same decision. Note that the net present value 
and the conditional probability lead to the same conclusion for extreme values such as 
scenario 1 and 2.  
The final scenario analyzes a project whose current values is Vto= $130M. Note that 
this value is less than the capital investment K = $150M. According to the net present value 
rule and Fig. 12, the investment is not profitable since the net value is less than zero. The 
conditional probability when the option to invest is exercised at a value of Vto= $130M is 
shown in Fig. 16. The black line represents the conditional probability. The surface is the 
conditional probability for different values of Vto. The surface is the same as Fig. 15.  The 
highest value of the conditional probability is 0.83 and the lowest value 0.045. The lowest 
value indicates that the capital investment is likely to be recovered even though the option is 
exercised at a value much lower than the optimal value.  Note the discrepancy between the 
net present value criterion and the perpetual option criterion. The first technique suggests not 
investing. On the other hand, a risk analysis based on option theory suggests, for the same 
value of the project, investing because the capital investment is likely to be recovered in the 
long term. Finally, observe that the optimal investment value provided by the option theory 
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V*=$327.66M is higher than $130M. If the TI waits until the optimal value is reached, the 
capital investment will be recovered with a high degree of certainty according to this 
analysis. However, the waiting time can be extremely high which might not incentivize 
transmission investment. This alternative analysis suggests that an early exercise might be 
profitable, and therefore encourages transmission investment.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Risk assessment of an option exercised at Vto = 130 M 
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CHAPTER 4. TRANSMISSION RATE DESIGN FOR A MERCHANT 
TRANSMISSION PROJECT 
 
4.1 Problem Formulation 
Consider a Merchant Transmission Project (MTP) that connects two separate zones as 
shown in Fig. 17. 
 
Zone A Zone B
Proposed merchant transmission project
 
Figure 17. A two-zone system 
 
Assume that the annual average zonal energy price and capacity price of zone A is 
given by AP   and AC , respectively. Similarly, BP   and BC  corresponds to the annual average 
zonal energy price and capacity price of zone B, respectively. Suppose that energy price and 
capacity payments in zone B are higher than those in zone A, i.e., BP P≥ A   and B AC C≥ . 
Additionally, zone A has a surplus of electric energy that can be exported to zone B. Note 
that the merchant transmission line is a market-driven economic solution if the economic 
 
 48 
benefits (energy price and capacity price reduction in zone B) derived from the project are 
higher than the total investment cost. 
Suppose that zone A can guarantee economic surplus to zone B over a specific period 
of time. A firm contract transmission service can be established between a zone B customer 
and the transmission provider (or investor) in order to import electric energy with the 
guaranteed transmission access. The firm contract provides a fix transmission line capability 
that is used to import energy from zone A. The firm contract can be offered to those 
customers in zone B who are interested in importing cheaper energy, through an open 
bidding process. The contract guarantees a deterministic cash flow to the provider, and 
therefore it reduces the risk of not recovering the capital investment in the new line. 
Suppose that, in addition to the guaranteed economic surplus, there is an excess of 
surplus energy from zone A that can not be fully guarantied. Outages of generating units, 
contingencies in zone A, etc., can cause the cheaper energy to become unavailable. The 
capacity of a merchant line project can be modeled as a combination of a guaranteed 
economic surplus and a random component of surplus, as shown in Fig. 18.  
Based on the previous considerations, this research proposes that the transmission 
provider recovers the capital investment via three mechanisms – (1) revenues from firm 
contracts, (2) revenues from incremental FTRs, and (3) revenues from a transmission rate 
based on a random component of cheaper energy. It is observed that the future cash flow has 
two random components, i.e., revenues from incremental FTRs and the transmission rate. 
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Transmission line capacity C
t
Active power from zone A to Zone B
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Figure 18. Merchant transmission line utilization 
 
In this research, a Transmission Rate (TR) is proposed as an additional recovery 
mechanism to increase the revenues and provide the needed incentives for enhancement of 
the transmission grid. Transmission rates are widely used by industry and regulatory agencies 
as a cost recovery mechanism. These rates are established ahead of time based on agreed 
formulas. Transmission rates are established based on the annual revenue requirement by the 
transmission developer, subject to the approval by FERC. Inflation, operation and 
maintenance, depreciation, and other economical factors are included in the calculation of the 
annual revenue requirement. However, the current practice of the transmission rate 
calculation does not include the economic benefits that the project brings to transmission 
customers and the power grid. In other words, TRs are normally cost-based rather than 
market-based. This is an important extension proposed by this research that is more 
appropriate for a competitive industry. The proposed approach establishes a transmission rate 
based on the following considerations: 
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1. Transmission customers are willing to pay for the MTP since energy price and 
capacity payments are expected to decrease once the project is in operation. 
2. Transmission investors intend to maximize the economical benefits from the 
investment. Furthermore, transmission investors are able to recover the capital 
investment within a certain confidence level.  
 
An important feature of the proposed approach is that the design of the transmission 
rate does not rely only on traditional industry practice, i.e., cost-based and revenue 
requirement. The market incentive (total market savings) necessary for a competitive 
environment is included as part of the mechanism design. The new design is expected to 
incentivize transmission customers to pay for a MTP based on the fact that economic benefits 
can be realized. Transmission investors are also incentivized since the investment can be 
recovered and the risks can be managed.   
 
4.2 Mathematical Formulation 
It was mentioned that the cost recovery mechanism is based on revenues from firm 
contracts, transmission rate and incremental FTRs. Hence, the daily revenues Rj, for day j are 
can be obtained as follows: 
 
 
j jj TR
R FTC R R
jFTR
= + +  (26) 
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where FTCj are daily revenues from firm transmission contracts. The term, RTRj, 
corresponds to the daily revenues from transmission rates, and the last term, RFTRj, constitutes 
daily revenues from incremental FTRs. Daily revenues from fix transmission services are 
established as the total value of the fix contracts divided by the duration of the contract on a 
daily basis. Revenues from transmission rates are defined as the random surplus from zone A 
to zone B multiplied by a transmission rate. Finally, revenues from transmission rights are 
the price difference between the two ends of the line multiplied by the incremental FTRs. 
Consequently, Equation (26) can be written as 
 
  (27) 
j
daily daily
j jR FTC TR MWh FTR P= + × + × Δ j
 
where FTCj is the daily revenues from firm contracts. TR is a transmission rate, and 
j
dailyMWh is the daily contribution of transmission customers located in zone B to the random 
surplus from zone A to zone B. FTR are the FTRs allocated to the transmission developer(s), 
and  is the average price difference between both ends of the line settled on a daily 
basis. Note that daily revenues from FTRs can be settled by summing over 24 hours of the 
hourly LMP price difference between the two ends of the line. The model can also be 
expressed in annual terms as shown in 
j
dailyPΔ
(28) 
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  (28) 
( )365 365
1 1
365 365
1 1
daily daily
j j
j j
daily daily
A j j
j j
A i i
Rj FTC TR MWh FTR P
FTC TR MWh FTR P
FTC TR MWh FTR P
= =
= =
= + × + × Δ
= + + Δ
= + × + × Δ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
j
where  
 
FTCA : Annual revenues from firm services 
TR : Transmission rate 
MWhi : Sum of daily j
dailyMWh  
FTR : Incremental FTRs 
ΔPi :  Sum of daily  j
dailyPΔ
 
 
Note that MWhi and ΔPi are random variables. Due to the random nature of revenues, 
the total revenues to transmission provider(s) are uncertain. As a result, the expected net 
present value of the total revenues over the cost recovery period can be written as: 
 
 
P
1 1 1
 
     
1 1
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(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
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i i i
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revenues from
transmission rights
RP
i
i
i
K
r=
−+∑

 (29) 
 
where RP, the upper limit for the summations, is the cost recovery period in years, r 
is the annual discount rate, and K is the capital investment.  
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Consider a transmission customer located in zone B. The expected present value of 
the total payments of the transmission customer once the MTP is in commercial operation is 
defined by three terms: 
 
1. Expected annual energy payments that are established by LMPs and energy 
consumption. 
2. Expected annual capacity payments that are defined based on the capacity 
requirements by the electricity market. 
3. Expected payments to transmission developer that are based on the transmission rate. 
 
Other payments such as network transmission services, ancillary services, etc., are 
ignored in this research because they are not considered significant for the proposed study. 
Consequently, the expected present value of the total payments of the customer j is given by: 
 
 
 
2
1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
Expected Expected ExpectedAnnual Annual Payments toEnergy Capacity transmissionPayments Payments developer
MT MTRP RP RP
ji ji i jMT
j i i i
i i i
E EP E CP TR E MWh LDF C C
E PV
r r r= = =
× × ×= + ++ + +∑ ∑ ∑
  
 (30) 
 
Here, the superscript MT denotes these payments that are made after the transmission 
line in operation, and the subscript j denote the transmission customer. MTjiEP  denotes the 
annual energy payment of a transmission customer. Similarly, MTjiCP indicates annual 
capacity payments. The last term of (30) corresponds to the payments to transmission 
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developer based on the proposed transmission rate, TR. Recall that C denotes the total 
transmission line capacity. Assume that the capacity reserved for non firm services is denoted 
as C2. Hence, C2/C is the fraction of the transmission line capacity that is used by the random 
surplus. LDF is the Load Distribution Factor that establishes the contribution of a customer 
to the power flow of the merchant line. The ratio C2/C, the load distribution factor LDFj, and 
the expected value of total MWhi establish the customer’s contribution to the annual random 
surplus from zone A to zone B. Observe that the random annual surplus in MWh is 
approximated by the product of C2/C and the total power flow from A to B, MWhi. In 
summary: 
MT
jiEP  : Annual energy payment in the presence of the merchant line 
MT
jiCP  : Annual capacity payments in the presence of the merchant line 
LDFj : Load distribution factor 
C2/C : Fraction of the transmission line capacity uses by random surplus 
 
Consider the case where zone A and zone B are not interconnected by a transmission 
line. The expected present value of the total payments of a transmission customer that is 
located in zone B is defined by:  
 
1 1(1 ) (1 )
Expected Expected
Annual Annual
Energy Capacity
Payments Payments
NMT NMTRP RP
ji jiNMT
j i
i i
E EP E CP
E PV
r r= =
= ++∑ ∑ i+
 
 (31) 
 
Here, the superscript NMT indicates that there is not a transmission line between zone 
A and zone B. Only two terms defined the expected payments: 1) Annual energy payments, 
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and 2) annual capacity payments. Payments to transmission developers are not considered 
due to the fact that there is not a transmission line to connect the two zones. 
Based on (30), (31), and the assumption considered in section I, the transmission rate 
can be obtained from the following optimization problem: 
 
 
( )
max ( )
.
1
( )
0
TR
MT NMT
j j
E NPV TR
s t
E PV E PV j N
CVaR NPV TR
TR
β δ
   
≤ ∀ =
− ≤
>
…  (32) 
 
The cost function of (32) corresponds to the expected net present value collected by 
the transmission developer defined by (29). N is the number of transmission customers 
designated to pay for the merchant project. The left hand side of a constraint of (6) is the total 
payments once the project is in commercial operation, whereas the right hand side is the 
payments in the absence of the merchant line. Note that the inequality guarantees that 
transmission customers located in B realize the benefits from the project. Finally, CVaR 
assures that the net present value is maximized with a certain confident level. 
 
4.3 Solution Method 
Suppose initially that all future values of the random variables are known, i.e., the 
future values of , , , , ,MT MT NMT NMi i ji ji ji jiMWh P EP CP EP CPΔ T can be forecasted accurately. Under 
this condition, the objective function can be rewritten as  
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1 1 1
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
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iA
i i i
i i i
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r r r= = =
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Note that the only variable is TR so that (33) corresponds to a straight line that is 
shown in Fig. 19. The slope of the line is given by (
1
(1 )
RP
i
i
i
)MWh r
=
+∑  and the y-intercept by 
( ) (
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
RP RP
i
A i
i i
FTC r FTR P r K
= =
+ + × Δ + −∑ ∑ )i . It has been shown that revenues from 
transmission rights are not sufficient for recovery of the capital investment. Thus, in the 
absence of revenues from firm contracts (FTCA) and transmission rate (TR), the y-intercept 
would be negative. The lower straight line represents such a case. The higher straight line 
corresponds to a case where the y-intercept is positive due to the presence of firm contracts.  
The vertical line is a constraint of (32) when it is rearranged as the inequality (34). 
Observe that there are N different vertical lines. Each line represents a different transmission 
customer. The constraint with the lowest right hand side value defines the feasible values of 
TR.  
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The optimal transmission rate TR* is established by the intersection of the leftmost 
vertical line and the straight line. Equation (35) shows the optimal value assuming that 
customer k has the lowest right hand value of  (34). 
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Figure 19. A graphical interpretation of equation (35) 
 
The optimal value TR* have the following important implications: 
1. Maximize the net present value of the future revenues for transmission investors. 
2. The optimal value TR* is established by one transmission customer that does not 
derive benefit from the merchant project for reason that the merchant transmission 
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project does not change the total payments. As mentioned, that customer corresponds 
to the leftmost vertical line in Fig. 19. The rest of transmission customers do receive 
benefits from the project since the total payments, once the line is in operation, are 
less than in the absence of the transmission line. However, the customer that does not 
obtain a direct benefit might be willing to pay for the project since energy price and 
capacity price might be less volatile once the new project is in operation. 
3. According to Fig. 19, values of the transmission rate between  are sub-
optimal solutions. This range of values can be considered as negotiation range. 
These values guarantee that all transmission customers derived economic benefits 
(savings) and the present value of the revenues is higher than the capital investment. 
Observe that the negotiation range provides wider incentives to transmission 
developers and hence can be attractive to investors.   
)*1,TR TR⎡⎣
 
Consider a nondeterministic case. Future values of the random variables are 
unknown. Define the loss function as the negative of NPV(TR). For this case, the 
optimization problem (32) provides a transmission rate for which the expected net present 
value is maximized and the losses do not exceed a threshold level δ within a confidence 
interval defined by β.  
Define a vector y as one that contains all random variables, i.e., the annual MWh and 
annual ΔP for every year. Recall that RP denotes the cost recovery period in years. Therefore, 
the vector y has 2 RP× components since every year has two random variables. The 
probability that the losses do not fall bellow a threshold α is given by 
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( , )
( , ) ( )
NPV TR y
TR p y dy
α
ψ α
− ≤
= ∫  (36) 
 
where p(y) is the joint probability distribution function of the random vector y. The β-
VaR and β-CVaR for a specified probability level β are denoted by (TRβ )α and ( )TRβφ  
respectively, and defined by:   
 
 ( ) { }max : ( , )TR R TRβα α ψ α β= ∈ ≤  (37) 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( )
1 ,
1 NPV TR y TR
TR NPV TR y p y dy
β
β
α
φ β − ≥
−= − ∫  (38) 
 
Equation (37) is the right endpoint such that ( , )TRψ α β= , i.e., the probability that 
the -NPV(TR,y) is equal to β. Equation (38) is the conditional expectation given that the 
losses are greater than . According to (TRβα )
)
[46]-[47], β-CVaR (equation (38)) can be 
characterized by a function ( ,F TRβ α as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ( )1, max , ,0
1 my R
F TR NPV TR y p y dyβ α α αβ ∈
= + − −− ∫ )  (39) 
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where m is the number of random variables. β-CVaR corresponds to the minimum 
value of ( , )F TRβ α as indicated by1: 
 
 ( ) ( )min ,TR F TRβ βαφ α=  (40) 
 
Equation (39) can be simplified by sampling the distribution p(y). Assume that the 
following sampling from p(y) is available 
 
 1 2( ), ( ), , ( )Mp y p y p y…  (41) 
 
The corresponding approximation of (39) is given by  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )(11, min ,1
M
i
i
F TR NPV TR p y
Mβ
α α αβ == + − −− ∑ ),0
                                                
 (42) 
 
Based on (42), the optimization can be formulated as a linear optimization problem as 
follows: 
 
 
1 See [46] for the mathematical proof. 
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Note that the joint distribution of y is not required. The linear optimization problem 
only requires a sampling from the distribution.   
 
4.4 Numerical Results 
Consider the two-zone system that is shown in Fig. 20. Zone B has four transmission 
customers (or sub – zones) that derive the economic benefits from the merchant project. 
Assume that the merchant transmission line is a 230KV transmission line with a nominal 
capability of 1000MW. The cost per mile for this new line is assumed to be $ 550,000/ mile, 
and the length of the line is 200 miles. The total capital investment is therefore $ 
110,000,000. 
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Sub zone 3
Zone A  C = 1000 MW
Sub zone 1 Sub zone 2
Zone B
Sub zone 4  
Figure 20. A two-zone system 
 
Assume that sub-zone 4 subscribes to a firm contract with the transmission developer 
that allows cheaper energy to be imported from zone A. It was mentioned that a firm contract 
guarantees a deterministic cash flow to the provider. Since sub–zone 4 is paying for the 
transmission project via a firm contract, it is not considered in the calculation of transmission 
rates. 
Table 1 shows the assumed annual energy and capacity payments for the three sub–
zones and the expected annual increments in the absence of the merchant line. On the other 
hand, table 2 shows the estimated and the increments once the merchant line is in operation. 
Note that all the payments in table 2 are lower than those in table 1. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the annual increments are the same in the absence or presence of the 
transmission line even though the methodology allows different increments. Observe that the 
payment reduction is an incentive for construction of a merchant line. 
The deterministic case is analyzed first. Assume that the firm contract recovers 40% 
of the total capital investment, i.e., $ 44,000,000.00. Revenues from financial transmission 
rights are assumed to recover 30% of the capital investment. This assumption relies on the 
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fact that FTRs can not be used to fully recover the investment. However, this assumption will 
be relaxed in order to analyze the impact on FTRs over the transmission rate.  
 
Table 1. Estimated annual payments and increment in the absence of a merchant line 
Absence of merchant transmission line 
Estimated annual payments Estimated Annual increment 
 
Energy 
payments 
Capacity 
payments 
Energy 
payments 
Capacity 
payments 
Sub zone 1 $ 6,000,000 $ 713,000 3 % 2 % 
Sub zone 2 $ 2,500,000 $ 158,000 1 % 1 % 
Sub zone 3 $ 5,000,000 $ 557,000 2 % 2 % 
 
Table 2. Estimated annual payments and increment in the presence of a merchant line 
Presence of merchant transmission line 
Estimated annual payments Estimated Annual increment 
 
Energy 
payments 
Capacity 
payments 
Energy 
payments 
Capacity 
payments 
Sub zone 1 $ 5,400,000 $ 640,000 3 % 2 % 
Sub zone 2 $ 2,375,000 $ 150,000 1 % 1 % 
Sub zone 3 $ 4,500,000 $ 500.000 2 % 2 % 
 
The load distribution factors of sub-zones 1, 2, 3 are, respectively, 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.30. Note that sub-zone 3 is responsible for 30% of the total flow from zone A to zone B, 
whereas sub-zone 2 has the lowest contribution.  
Two different values for the expected line utilization for the random component are 
considered: 40% and 60%, i.e., on average, the random surplus will use 40% or 60% of the 
non-firm capacity. With the estimated payments, the load distribution factors, and a discount 
rate of 9%, the transmission rate can be found based on (35) for different value of non-firm 
capacity. The results are shown in Fig. 21.  
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The horizontal axis represents non-firm line utilization as a percentage of line 
capacity. For instance, a value of 0.4 indicates that 400 MW (40% of C) is utilized by non-
firm service, whereas 600 MW (60% of C) is reserved for firm services. The vertical axis 
represents transmission rate values. The upper curve corresponds to the values whether the 
expected line utilization of non-firm service is 40%. Note that a lower expected line 
utilization by non-firm capacity is compensated with a higher transmission rate. In other 
words, the 30% that needs to be recovered by the transmission rate is affected inversely by 
the expected value of line utilization, i.e., high expected utilization reduces the required 
transmission rate as indicated by Fig. 21.  
 
Figure 21. Transmission rate for different value of non firm capacity 
 
Suppose that the expected annual non firm utilization is not constant, i.e., the 
expected annual power flow through the line changes over time.  
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The capacity of a transmission line is designed taking into account the fact that 
demand increases over time, i.e., some capability is left for future power flow increment. As 
a consequence, the expected annual power flow through the line increases as time goes on. 
The upper right corner of Fig. 22 shows a hypothetical annual expected power flow over the 
cost recovery period. It is expected that the line becomes congested once the power flow 
reaches the maximum transmission line capability. Congestion is a market signal. It increases 
prices, and hence facilitates new generation. Once new generation capacity is installed in 
zone B, it may not be necessary to import energy from zone A, and therefore power flow 
through the line is expected to decrease. The upper figure on Fig. 22 depicts such a behavior. 
Note that the annual expected non firm utilization is therefore not constant over the cost 
recovery period.  
Suppose that the power flow increases 5% annually. The line remains congested for 5 
years, and the power flow decreases 5% annually. Fig. 22 shows the transmission rate for that 
scenario. The curve is compared with the two curves given in Fig. 21. Note that a variable 
expected non firm utilization leads to results similar to those from a constant expected value 
of 60%. This suggests that a constant expected value can accurately approximate the value of 
the transmission rate. This reduces the computational effort required for the calculation of 
variable expected power flow. However, an inaccurate estimation of the constant expected 
value can cause an overestimate of the transmission rate as shown by the upper curve in Fig. 
22. Hence, the constant expected value must be identified in order to obtain accurate results. 
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Figure 22. Transmission rate for variable expected value of non firm utilization 
 
According to (35), the transmission rate shown in Fig. 21 is the upper limit of the 
negotiation range. Savings for all sub-zones are realized for lower values. However, the 
upper limit does not guarantee that the investment can be recovered. Fig. 23 shows the net 
present value, for the deterministic case, for different values of TR and non-firm line 
utilization. The figure on the left side shows a cutting plane that divided the net present value 
surface. The upper part, as shown in the figure, corresponds to positive values of the NPR, 
whereas the lower part represents the negative values. The figure on the right hand side 
shows the breakeven curve on the plane defined by the transmission rate and non-firm line 
utilization, i.e., it is the projection of NPV on that plane. The upper right area is the values 
that recover the capital investment, while the lower left values represents losses for the 
investor. 
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Figure 23. Net present value as function of transmission rate and non firm capacity 
 
The negotiation range can be established using Fig. 21 (or Fig. 22) and Fig. 23. Recall 
that Fig. 21 provides the upper limit whereas Fig. 23 provides a breakeven curve for the net 
present value. Consider that the transmission provider subscribes to a firm contract with sub-
zone 4 that reserves 40% of the capacity and recovers 40% of the capital investment. As a 
consequence, 60 % of the line is used by non-firm services. Assume also that revenues from 
transmission rights are 20 % of the capital. Figure 24 shows the negotiation range for that 
situation. The horizontal line is the upper limit of the transmission rate from Fig. 21, i.e., TR 
= 12.25 $  / MWh. The lower value is defined by the upper curve. Note that a value that 
belongs to that negotiation range represents savings for all sub-zones. Figure 24 also shows 
the effect of FTRs revenues on the negotiation range. The upper limit is not affected by the 
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FTRs according to (35). However, the lower limit changes as shown in Fig. 24. It is observed 
that higher revenues from FTRs increase the negotiation range. 
 
Figure 24. Negotiation range for a deterministic case 
 
Suppose that the investor sets the maximum loss for the net present value as 5% of 
the capital investment, i.e., $ 5,500,000.00. The confidence level is set by the investor to be 
95 %. It means that, 95 % of the time, the losses (net present value) should not exceed $ 5.5 
millions. Based on these considerations, Fig. 25 shows the transmission rate obtained by (43)
. Different values of the net present value are generated randomly to simulated future 
uncertainties. Note that the optimal values obtained by the optimization problem are lower 
that the deterministic values. This result confirms the intuition that investors need to be more 
conservative if losses are to be kept within a certain confidence level. As a consequence of 
the lower values, the negotiation range is reduced, which is shown in Fig. 26. 
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Figure 25. Transmission rate for different value of non firm capacity: Stochastic case 
 
Two cases are considered in Fig. 26. First, consider the case where an investor firms a 
contract that reserves 40 % of the line and recovers 40 % of the capital using firm services. 
The lower breakeven curve corresponds to a case where FTRs recover 30 % of the line. The 
negotiation range is highlighted in Fig. 26 that is smaller than the range shown in Fig. 24. 
Second, consider that revenues from FTRs recover 20 % of the capital. Note that the 
negotiation range is in the infeasible area (negative values of NPV). Hence, it is evident that 
uncertainty needs to be included in the calculation of transmission rates since Fig. 24 shows 
that under the same circumstance the negotiation range is feasible. 
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Figure 26. Negotiation range stochastic case 
 
 71 
CHAPTER 5. INTERACTION BETWEEN POWER PLANT 
INVESTMENT AND TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT:  A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 Problem Formulation 
An extended approach to evaluate of merchant transmission investments is presented 
in this section. Consider the merchant transmission project shown in Fig. 26. It was 
mentioned that a merchant transmission project as a market driven solution is used to bring 
cheaper energy from inexpensive generators. Cost recovery of merchant projects, at least in 
theory, would be from those who benefit from the cheaper energy. Two LSEs are shown in 
Fig. 26 as direct beneficiaries of the merchant project, i.e., LSE1 and LSE2. Note that LSE1 
and LSE2 might not be affiliated with the project developer.  
 
G1 G2 LSE 1 LSE 2
LSE 3
G3
G4G5
1 2 3
4
5 Merchant
Project
Merchant
Project
beneficiaries
zone 1
 
Figure 27. A merchant project in a 5 bus system 
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A transmission investment decision is based primarily on the perceived energy 
savings of LSE1 and LSE2 and the payment from them to the project developer. The present 
value of the future expected cash flow (payments from LSEs) establishes the value of the 
project. However, in a deregulated environment, it is difficult to provide an accurate revenue 
forecast due to the high volatility of energy prices. Therefore, revenues from the energy 
market are uncertain and, as a result, the value of the project is also uncertain. 
Strategic interaction among different participants also increases uncertainty during 
the decision making process. Consider two investors: A merchant transmission developer 
(MTD) and a generator developer (GD) who are willing to invest in the power system 
showing in Fig 26. Whether GD decides to invest in zone 1 is a crucial factor to MTD’s 
decision, i.e., a new generation at bus 2 or 3 changes energy prices and, therefore, revenues 
from the market to the merchant transmission developer. 
A merchant transmission project or generator project evaluation must take into 
account uncertainty of future cash flow and uncertainty of others’ decision as part of the 
decision making process. When all these elements are incorporated into the financial 
analysis, more accurate project evaluation is achieved.   
Note that a merchant transmission project and a new generation project share the 
following characteristics: 
1. Future revenues from the energy market are stochastic. 
2. The investment decision is irreversible. 
3. Developers have no obligation to build. In other words, the investment can be delayed 
until favorable economic conditions arise. 
4. MTD’s decision affects GD’s decision and vice versa. 
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Real options and game theory are two techniques that are used to evaluate projects 
under uncertainty and strategic interaction. Real options take into account uncertainty over 
future revenues, irreversible investments and time delay (characteristics 1, 2 and 3). On the 
other hand, game theory is a common technique where interactions between investors are 
considered (characteristic 4). When real options and game theory are combined, a better 
project evaluation along with an investment strategy is achieved in which all the above-
mentioned characteristics can be considered.  
Game theory has been widely used to study strategy interactions among competitors. 
In this research, the theory allows evaluating different strategies, i.e., various investment 
strategies can be analyzed when benefits of each strategy depends on the choices of other 
investors. Consider the follow simultaneous game in which MTD and GD (game players) are 
involved. Two strategies are considered for each player, i.e., invest (1) or defer (2). The 
payoffs matrix is shown in Fig. 27. The pair value ( ),MTD GDij ijπ π  represents the expected 
revenues of the MTD and GD, respectively. Subscripts are used to represent the strategy. For 
instance, ( 12 12, )MTD GDπ π denotes the expected revenues when MTD chooses to invest, and GD 
chooses to defer. Each pair value of revenues is calculated based on the expected revenues of 
the chosen strategy. The extensive form representation of the game is illustrated in Fig. 28. 
The dashed line represents a simultaneous game. 
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Figure 28. Normal form representation of a simultaneous game 
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Figure 29. Extensive form representation of a simultaneous game 
 
Suppose that MTD and GD face a simultaneous game at T0. Three different scenarios 
could arise, namely: 
 
1. Nash equilibrium is reached when MTD and GD decide to invest, and hence the game 
is over. 
2. Either player can invest. The investor (MTD or GD) becomes the leader and the other 
player is then the follower. The follower will make the decision (invest or delay) 
based on future electricity market conditions and knowledge of the leader’s decision. 
Although the leader’s decision is already known, revenues from the energy market 
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are still uncertain. Game theory provides a way to take into account uncertainties. A 
third player, called Nature and denoted as N, enters the game. Nature represents 
uncertainties from the energy market. Nature can move the game up or down. The 
game is moved up when the energy market offers favorable economic conditions to 
the follower, i.e., higher expected revenues. When economic conditions are 
unfavorable, the game is moved down. 
3. MTD and GD decide to delay the investment. Nature subsequently moves the game 
up or down, and a simultaneous game is played again at a future time T1.  
 
( , )( , ) ( , )
MTD
GD GD
I D
I D I D
N
du
GD
I D
GD
I D
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
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du
I D I D
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
MTD MTD
( , )
N
du
( , ) ( , )
MTD
GD
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I D
GD
( , ) ( , )
I D
( , ) ( , )
MTD
GD
I D
I D
GD
( , ) ( , )
I D
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Figure 30. The game in extensive form 
 
Figure 29 summarizes all possible outcomes of the game for a two period game (T0 
and T1). Each pair of parentheses represents the total revenues at different stages of the game. 
Note that revenues at T0 depend on the different outcomes of the game at T1. Real option 
theory provides a way to compute the value of the project at T0 having the project value at T1. 
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In other words, the final investment decision depends on the total values at T0 that are 
established working backward from T1, i.e., values at T1 are discounted using risk-neutral 
probabilities, established by real option theory, and a risk free discount rate. As a 
consequence of discounted future values using risk-neutral probabilities, the value of the 
project implicitly includes the value of the option to invest. The project value at T0 is thus 
more accurate when it is compared with other capital budgeting techniques. 
Given that Nash equilibrium specifies a set of strategies where no investor has an 
incentive to change unilaterally, it indicates the investment decision that investors should 
make at T0. Additionally, Nash equilibrium is an indicator to policy-makers to better 
understand investors’ behavior and market incentives. For instance, a monopolistic outcome 
indicates that either MTD or GD has invested, and there is not further incentive for any 
additional investor to enter the market. This situation might lead to market power and thus a 
decrement of social welfare. Different market incentives might change the equilibrium and 
therefore promote more investments. 
 
5.2 Numerical Approach 
 
Consider the power grid shown in Fig. 26. Revenues collected by the developer come 
from the market. Specifically, the merchant transmission project revenues are based on 
energy savings of LSE1 and LSE2 once the project is in commercial operation. On the other 
hand, generators’ revenues are established according to the marginal price at generator’s 
location.  
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Consider the following cases: 
Case 1: The base case as shown in Fig. 26. Neither new project is in commercial 
operation.  
Case 2: The base case including a new merchant project. The merchant project 
connects bus 1 and bus 2. 
Case 3:  The base case including a new generation at bus 2. 
Case 4: The base case including a new generation at bus 2 and a new merchant project 
which connects bus 1 and bus 2. 
 
Locational marginal prices are calculated for each case over a year. System data are 
found in [43]. Monthly average marginal prices are considered instead of hourly marginal 
prices, i.e., an optimal DC power flow is computed having a nodal demand equal to the 
average monthly demand. Generation costs are assumed constant, and contingencies are not 
considered over the year.   
The annual savings for LSE1 or LSE2, denoted as CMD (Cash to Merchant Developer), 
once the merchant project is in commercial operation and, if capacity payments are ignored, 
are given by: 
   
 ( ) (1 212
1
1 12 iC CMD i i i
i
C LMP LMP MWh r
=
= − × × +∑ )  (44) 
where  
1C
iLMP  : Month i average marginal price for case 1 at LSE location. 
2C
iLMP  : Month i average marginal price for case 2 at LSE location. 
MWhi : Monthly energy consumption for month i 
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r : Annual discount rate 
 
Note that CMD corresponds to the future value of annual savings. The total expected 
payment from LSE1 and LSE2 to MTD is the sum of savings of LSE1 and LSE2. Similarly, 
annual revenues, denoted as CGD (Cash to Generator Developer), once the new generation is 
in commercial operation, are given by 
 
 (312
1
1 12 iCGD i i
i
C LMP MWh r
=
= × × +∑ )  (45) 
 
where corresponds to the average monthly marginal price for month i, case 3, 
at generator location, and MWh
3C
iLMP
i denotes the monthly energy generated by the generator.  
Annual cash flow when a merchant project and generator project are both in 
commercial operation can also be obtained from (44) and (45). In such case, and 
 are replaced by in 
2C
iLMP
3C
iLMP 4
C
iLMP (44) and (45) respectively.  
Having CGD or CMD, total revenues R is the present value of a growing annuity over 
the cost recovery period, specifically: 
 
 1 1 1
1
tgR C
r g r g r
⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞= × −⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ − − +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (46) 
where  
R :  Total revenues 
C : Annual cash inflow. C corresponds to CGD (equation 8) or CMD (equation 9) 
g : Growing rate 
t : Cost recovery period 
 
 79 
 
Annual revenues are assumed to grow at a constant rate g for this numerical example. 
A steady load increment over time is expected to produce more congestions. As a 
consequence, it is projected that the difference of LMPs (equation (45)) and LMPs (equation 
(46)) grows over time and hence revenues from the market to developers also increase. This 
assumption will be discussed in the next steps of this research. 
Assume that all demands (LSE1, LSE2, and LSE1) have a steady increment of 3% 
from T0 to T1, i.e., for 3 years. It is also assumed that the growing rate may change to 5% or 
1% at T1, i.e., Nature (N) inserts an uncertainty about the future growing rate and hence 
future revenues. Table 3 shows the present value of expected cash flow over 30 years at T1. 
They are derived from equations (44), (45) and (46). Note that there are not revenues when 
MTD and GD defer the investment decision. However, a different value might be obtained 
when total payoffs are established using option theory, i.e., although the merchant project or 
generation project are not generating revenues, the option to invest (defer the investment 
decision) can have a positive value. Payoffs using option analysis and reaction functions will 
be explored in further steps of this research. 
 
Table 3. MTD and GD Revenues at T1 
Scenario 
MTD 
Decision 
GD  
Decision 
Nature 
Merchant Transmission 
Developer (MTD) 
Revenues 
Generator Developer 
(GD) Revenues 
Defer Defer  $                   0.00     $                   0.00    
Defer Invest  $                   0.00    $     1,649,835.00  
Invest Defer  $     1,985,686.00   $                   0.00    
Invest Invest 
u=5% 
 $       499,703.00   $     1,392,922.00  
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Defer Defer  $                   0.00     $                   0.00    
Defer Invest  $                   0.00     $     2,426,118.00  
Invest Defer  $     2,919,995.00   $                   0.00    
Invest Invest 
d=1% 
 $       734,824.00   $     2,048,323.00  
 
 
Different values at T0 (Fig. 29) when MTD and GD defer the investment is found 
using binomial approach where the state value of each node at T1 corresponds to Nash 
equilibrium for u=5% and d=1%. Nash equilibria are shown in bold face in table 4.   
 
Assuming a risk free rate of r=10%  and a risk-neutral probability of p=0.4, the 
present value at T0 is given by: 
 
 
(1 ) 0.4 499,703 (1 0.4) 734,819 582,520
1 1 0.1
(1 ) 0.4 1,392,922 (1 0.4) 2,048,323 1,623,800
1 1 0.1
MTD MTD
MTD
GTD GTD
GD
pV p VC
r
pV p VC
r
+ −
+ −
+ − × + − ×= = =+ +
+ − × + − ×= = =+ +
 (47) 
 
Table 4 presents the payoffs at T0. Note that the values when MTD and GD postpone 
the investment correspond to equation (47). Payoffs for other strategies are the present value 
of the expected cash flow –equations (44),  (45) and (46)– for a growing rate of 3%. Given 
that no reaction function is considered, revenues when GD or MTD postpone the investment 
and the other player invests are zero. The reaction function provides a way to evaluate the 
project at T1 and therefore has a non-zero value at T0. 
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Table 4. MTD and GD Revenues at T0 
M
TD
GD
Invest
Defer
Invest Defer
( ) $ 582520.00 , $ 1623800.00 
( )$ 537776.00 , $ 1593340.00 ( ) $ 1508551.00 , $ 0.00 
( ) $ 0.00 , $ 1849115.00 
 
 
Nash equilibrium is reached when MTD and GD invest. However, MTD and GD are 
better off when both decide to defer the investment. In other words, it is possible to improve 
MTD and GD’s rewards when MTD and GD coordinate their actions and postpone the 
investment.  
It is noted that this hypothetical electricity market where revenues are based only on 
marginal prices might offer enough incentives to invest, i.e., Nash equilibrium is reached 
when MTD and GD invest. However, real electricity markets are more complex and might 
not offer sufficient incentives. The following issues need to be addressed in further steps in 
order to complete a more comprehensive study:  
1. Reaction function: MTD and GD will react once the other player files an 
interconnection request. The value of the option to invest is then changed and so does 
the value of the project. Therefore, reaction functions have to be part of the evaluation 
process. 
2. Cooperative game: Market administrator can encourage cooperation between 
different investors as a way to improve social welfare and reduce the risks of 
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investments. This leads to a different game where MTD and GD are more interested 
in cooperation than competition.  
3. Existence of Nash equilibrium: A set of market incentives will be studied in order to 
prove mathematically the existence of Nash equilibria. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION  
 
A traditional method used by vertically integrated power utility companies in 
transmission investment projects is to invest now, file for regulatory approval to include the 
capital investment in the rate, and file for a new rate case if the previously approved rate does 
not generate sufficient revenues to recover the costs. In the past, this approach allows the 
utility to fully recover its transmission investments. However, in today's competitive industry 
environment, it is no longer certain that the rate case would result in a full recovery of the 
investment. The market structure for electric energy is fairly well set up in the U.S. power 
industry today. Therefore the economic signal for power plant investment is clear. In 
contract, the investment / return mechanism for transmission capabilities is not well 
established. As a result, there are insufficient economic incentives to attract investments in 
transmission grid expansion. This is particularly true for merchant transmission projects.  
In general, investing in transmission is an irreversible decision. To avoid a failure to 
recover the investment in a project requires a prudent decision that relies on accurate load 
and revenue forecast whose accuracy improves as more information becomes available. For 
Merchant Transmission investment, such a waiting time is available before making an 
investment decision. Since there is no obligation to build and there is not a firm 
commissioning date to complete a merchant transmission project, a transmission investor can 
1) postpone a decision until more favorable information is available and a better revenue cash 
flow is projected, or 2) forgo the investment decision without incurring a heavy financial 
penalty if the projected revenue from the newly available information shows that the 
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investment cannot be recovered. Taking advantage of this flexibility, this dissertation 
presents an investment strategy that mirrors a stock option method to identify the optimal 
investment criterion for exercising an option to build the Merchant Transmission. 
The decision process is based on a stochastic revenue model from an approved fixed 
transmission rate. A rate design based on 1CP methodology is used to illustrate the 
effectiveness of the option approach. The approach also shows that lowering the risk of not 
recovering the investment through added incentives (i.e. revenues from transmission rights or 
added initial incentives to an approved fixed transmission rate) would encourage merchant 
transmission investment. Finally, it is important to point out that the proposed method only 
provides the probability that the investment can be fully recovered for making an investment 
decision. It does not guarantee full recovery in actuality due to market and demand 
uncertainties.  
A tool to help transmission investors quantify the risk of not recovering the capital 
investment when the option is exercised is developed. The resulting conditional probability 
provides additional information from which a decision to construct the project can be made. 
Three scenarios are analyzed in order to evaluate the impact of different suboptimal values 
on the conditional probability of not recovering the capital investment. A comparison with 
the net present value rule is performed. The results show that an early exercise of the option 
to build can still be profitable in the long term when future uncertainties are favorable, even 
though the present value of future cash flows is lower than the capital investment. The 
proposed risk analysis technique might also be used by regulators to determine the necessary 
incentives to promote transmission investment when the present value analysis shows that the 
project is not favorable. A constant mean and variance of the stochastic process model, 
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Geometric Brownian Motion, is an assumption that needs to be relaxed in the future work. 
However, GBM is a simplification that allows, via Kolgomorov equations, a quick estimation 
of the transmission investment risk. 
Incentives via a transmission rate are explored in this research. A novel market – 
driven rate is developed in order to provide additional economic incentives to developers. 
The design criterion is that all transmission customers derive economic benefits from the new 
projects and developers obtain the maximum expected value of the revenues. The rate 
charges all customers according to their contribution of MWh that flows from a zone that has 
a surplus of electricity to another zone that has an interest in cheaper energy. The 
methodology also establishes a negotiation range. The range of rates guarantees a positive net 
present value for the investment and savings for all investors. Numerical results suggest that 
this market driven mechanism along with FTRs and firm transmission services can assure 
that the capital investment is fully recover. Moreover, the rate is easy to implement since the 
power flow contribution by each transmission customer can be measured using the available 
technology. The rate can also be established ahead of time. The rate does not require 
significant changes in regulation, and hence it would be more acceptable to power utilities. 
A theoretical framework is presented in which the impact of power plants investment 
on transmission investment is evaluated. The net present value and decision tree often over-
or under-evaluated the value of the project when others’ decisions are ignored. When all 
characteristics (strategic interaction, option to delay, uncertainty over revenues, etc.) of a 
merchant project are taken into account, a project can be accurately evaluated, leading to 
more informed decisions by the investor.   
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Finally, this dissertation presents a comprehensive analysis of merchant transmission 
projects. New concepts and techniques for the merchant transmission investment are 
developed that serve as a market – driven investment solution. It is believe that the proposed 
methods can play a significant role as the industry deals with the aging and increasingly 
weakened power infrastructure. 
 
 87 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[1] “Final Rule Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform under 
RM06-4,” The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp Docket Number: RM06-4. 
 
[2]  “2006 Long-Term Reliability Assessment,” North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation. [Online] Available: 
ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/docs/pubs/LTRA2006.pdf
 
[3] W. Hogan, “Financial Transmission Rights Formulations,” [Online] Available: 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~whogan/ 
 
[4] P. Joskow, “Transmission Policy in the United States,” Utilities Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, 
pp. 95-115, Jun. 2005.  
 
[5] P. Joskow, “Merchant Transmission Investment,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 
vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 233-264. Jun. 2005. 
 
[6] P. Joskow, and J.J. Tirole, “Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power 
Network,” Journal on Economics, vol. 21, no. 3. pp. 450-487. 2000. 
 
[7] I.J. Perez-Arriaga, F.J. Rubio, J.F. Puerta, J. Arceluz, and J. Marin, “Marginal Pricing 
of Transmission Services: an Analysis of Cost Recovery,” IEEE Trans. on Power 
Systems, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 546–553, Feb. 1995. 
 
[8] W. Hogan, “Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission,” vol. 4, no. 3, 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, pp. 211-245, Sep.1992. 
 
[9] J. M. Griffin, Electricity Deregulation: Choices and Challenges. University of 
Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
[10] F. Lévêque, Competitive Electricity Markets and Sustainability. Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, 2006. 
 
[11] S.S. Oren, P.T. Spiller, P. Varaiya, and F. Wu, “Nodal Prices and Transmission 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 24-35, April 
1995. 
 
[12] G. Brunekreeft, “Electricity Transmission: An Overview of the Current Debate,” 
Utilities Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 73-93, Jun. 2005.  
 
[13] J.B. Bushnell, and S.S. Stoft. “Electric Grid Investment under a Contract Network 
Regime,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 61–79. July. 1996. 
 
 88 
 
[14] F.F. Wu, F.L Zheng, and F.S Wen, “Transmission Investment and Expansion 
Planning in a Restructured Electricity Market,” Energy, vol. 31, issues 6-7, pp. 954-
966, May-June 2006. 
 
[15] L. Cameron, “Transmission Investment: Obstacles to a Market Approach,” The 
Electricity Journal, vol. 14, issue 2, pp. 25-38. March 2001. 
 
[16] Edison Electric Institute. “Meeting the Transmission Needs”. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/energy_infrastructure/transmission/meeting_trans
_needs.pdf 
 
[17] H.A. Gil, F.D. Galiana, and A.J. Conejo, “Multiarea Transmission Network Cost 
Allocation,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 1293-1301, Aug. 
2005. 
 
[18] J.M. Zolezzi, and H. Rudnick, “Transmission Cost Allocation by Cooperative Games 
and Coalition Formation,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 1008-
1015, Nov. 2002. 
 
[19] G. Bautista, and V.H. Quintana, “Screening and Mitigation of Exacerbated Market 
Power Due to Financial Transmission Rights,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 
20, no. 1, pp. 213-222, Feb. 2005. 
 
[20] X. Ma, D.I. Sun, and A. Ott, “Implementation of the PJM Financial Transmission 
Rights Auction Market System.” presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society 
Summer Meeting, 2002. vol. 3, pp. 1360 – 1365.  
 
[21] M.O. Buygi, G. Balzer, H.M. Shanechi, and M. Shahidehpour, “Market-based 
Transmission Expansion Planning,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 19, no. 4, 
pp. 2060-2067, Nov. 2004. 
 
[22] A. Dixit, and R. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1994. 
 
[23] Pindyck, R. S. “Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. XXIX, pp. 1110-1148, Sep 1991. 
 
[24] S.H. Martzoukos, and W. Teplitz-Sembitzky, “Optimal Timing of Transmission Line 
in the Face of Uncertainty Demand. An Option Valuation Approach,” Energy 
Economics, vol. 14, pp. 3-10, Jan. 1992. 
 
[25] K.W. Hedman, F. Gao, and G.B. Sheblé, “Overview of Transmission Expansion 
Planning Using Real Options Analysis,” presented at the Proceedings of the 37th 
Annual North American Power Symposium 2005, pp. 497-502. 
 
 89 
 
[26] D.G. Luenberger, Investment Science. Oxford University Press: New York, NY; 1998. 
 
[27] J.C. Hull, Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, 6th ed., Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
2006.  
 
[28] A. Dixit, The art of Smooth Pasting, Vol. 55 in Fundamentals of Pure and Applied 
Economics, eds Jacques Lesourne and Hugo Sonnenschein: Chur, Switzerland: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993. 
 
[29] R.A. Brealey, S.C. Myers, and F. Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, 8th ed. 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2006. 
 
[30] L. Trigeorgis, Real Options. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996. 
 
[31] WIRES. The Working Group for Investment in Reliable and Economic Electric 
Systems. “On Allocating the Cost of New Transmission Investment: Practice and 
Principles”. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.analysisgroup.com/analysisgroup/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Blue
_Ribbon_Panel_Final_Report.pdf
 
[32] E.E. Sauma, and S.S. Oren. “Economic Criteria for Planning Transmission Investment 
in Restructured Electricity Markets,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 22, no. 4, 
pp. 1394-1405, Nov. 2007. 
 
[33] E.E. Sauma, and S.S. Oren, “Proactive Planning and Valuation of Transmission 
Investments in Restructured Electricity Markets,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 
vol. 30, issue 3, 2006. 
 
[34] S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell, S. Stoft, “The Competitive Effects of Transmission 
Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry.” Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 2, 
pp. 294–325, 2000. 
 
[35] E.E. Sauma, and S.S. Oren. “Proactive Transmission Investment in Competitive 
Power Systems,” presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 
2006.  
 
[36] G. Latorre, R. Cruz, J. Areiza, and A. Villegas. “Classification of Publications and 
Models on Transmission Expansion Planning,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 
18, no. 2, pp. 938–946, May. 2003. 
 
[37] J.H. Roh, M. Shahidehpour, and Y. Fu. “Market-Based Coordination of Transmission 
and Generation Capacity Planning,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 22, no. 4, pp 
1406-1419, Nov. 2007. 
 
 
 90 
[38] H. Salazar, C.C. Liu, and R.F. Chu, “Decision Analysis of Merchant Transmission 
Investment by Perpetual Options Theory,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 22, 
no. 3, pp. 1194-1201, Aug 2007. 
 
[39] PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff. Section 34. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.pjm.com/documents/downloads/agreements/tariff.pdf 
 
[40] S. Shreve, Stochastic Calculus for Finance. Springer: New York, NY; 2004. 
 
[41] S.S. Oren, P.T. Spiller, P. Varaiya, and F. Wu, “Nodal Prices and Transmission 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 24-35, April 
1995. 
 
[42] Han.T.J. Smit, and L. Tregeorgis, Strategic Investment: Real Options and Games. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
 
[43] J. Sun, and L. S. Tesfatsion. Dynamic Testing of Wholesale Power Market Designs: 
An open-source agent-based framework. ISU Economics Working Paper #06025, July 
27, 2006 (April 9, 2007). [Online] Available:  
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_12649_06025.pdf 
 
[44] X. Ma, D.I. Sun, and A. Ott, “Implementation of the PJM financial transmission rights 
auction market system.” presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer 
Meeting, 2002. Volume 3, page(s): 1360 – 1365. 
 
[45] D. Fudenberg, and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991. 
 
[46] R.T. Rockafellar, and S. Uryasev, “Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk,” The 
Journal of Risk, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 21 – 41, 2000. 
 
[47] R.T. Rockafellar, and S. Uryasev, “Conditional Value-at-Risk or General Loss 
Distribution,” University of Florida. Research Report #2001-5 [Online] Available: 
http://www.ise.ufl.edu/uryasev/CVaR2.pdf 
 
[48] J. Palmquist, S. Uryasev, and P. Krokhmal, “Portfolio Optimization With Conditional 
Value-at-Risk Objective and Constraints,” The Journal of Risk, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 11-
27, 2002. [Online] Available: 
http://www.ise.ufl.edu/uryasev/kro_CVaR.pdf 
 
[49] S.P. Uryasev, Probabilistic Constrained Optimization: Methodology and 
Applications. Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
[50] P. Kall, and J. Mayer, Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and 
Computation. New York: Springer Science, 2005. 
 
 
 91 
[51] C. Weber, Uncertainty in the Electric Power Industry: Methods and Models for 
Decision Support. New York: Springer Science, 2005. 
 
[52] R.A. Jabr, “Robust Self-Scheduling Under Price Uncertainty Using Conditional 
Value-at-Risk,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1852-1858, Nov. 
2005. 
 
[53] R. Dahlgren, C.C. Liu, and J. Lawarrée, “Risk Assessment in Energy Trading,” IEEE 
Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 503-511, May. 2003. 
 
[54] R. Bjorgan, C.C. Liu, and J. Lawarrée, “Financial Risk Assessment in Energy 
Trading,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 503-511, May. 2003. 
 
[55] M. Denton, A. Palmer, R. Masiello, P. Skantze, “Managing Market Risk in Energy,” 
IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 494-502, May. 2003. 
 
[56] C. Lusztig, P. Fedberg, R. Orans, and A. Olson, “A Survey of Transmission Tariffs in 
North America,” Energy, vol. 31, pp. 1017-1039, 2006. 
 
[57] M.P. Rodriguez-Ortega, J. Ignacio Pérez-Arriaga, J. R. Abbad, and J. P. González, 
“Distribution Network Tariffs: A Close Question?,”  Energy Policy, vol. 36, pp. 
1712–1725, 2008. 
 
[58] H. Parmesano, “Rate Design is The No. 1 Energy Efficiency Tool,” The Electricity 
Journal, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 18-25, 2007. 
 
[59] F. Lévêque, Transport Pricing of Electricity Networks. Norwell, MA: Kluwer 
Academic Publisher, 2003. 
 
[60] T.P. Lyon, “Why Rate-of-Return Adders are Unlikely to Increase Transmission 
Investment,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 48-55, 2007. 
 
[61] A. Faruqui, and S.S. George, “Pushing the Envelop on Rate Design,” The Electricity 
Journal, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 33-42, 2006. 
 
[62] D. Shirmohammadi, X.V. Filho, B. Gorestin, and M.V.P. Pereira, “Some 
Fundamental Technical Concepts About Cost Based Transmission Pricing,” IEEE 
Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 1002-1008, May. 1996. 
 
[63] T.W. Gedra, “On Transmission Congestion and Pricing,” IEEE Trans. on Power 
Systems, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 241-248, May. 1999. 
 
[64] F. Woolf, Global Transmission Expansion. Recipes for Success. PennWell Corp, 
2003. 
 
 
 92 
[65] J. Contreras, G. Gross, I. Ruiz-Gómez, and J. M. Arroyo, “A scheme for incentivizing 
investments and cost sharing in transmission enhancements,” Procedures PSCC XVI 
Glasgow, July 2008. [Online] Available: 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f382,10626/10626_paper_jc_nov07.pdf 
 
[66] I. Vogelsang, “Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation,” 
Energy Journal, vol. 27, no. 44, pp. 97-127, 2006.  
 
[67] A. Mazer, Electric Power Planning for Regulated and Deregulated Markets. Wiley-
IEEE Press, 2007. 
 
[68] A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1988. 
 
[69] S. Stoft, Power System Economics. Wiley-IEEE Press, 2002. 
 
[70] S. Blumsack, L.B. Lave, and M. Ilic, “The Real Problem with Merchant 
Transmission,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 9-19, 2008. 
 
[71] R.L. Shockley. An Applied Course in Real Options Valuation. Mason, OH: Thomson 
South-West, 2007. 
 
 
 
 93 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
H. Salazar, C.C. Liu, and R.F. Chu, “Decision Analysis of Merchant Transmission 
Investment by Perpetual Option Theory,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 
1194-1201, Aug. 2007. 
 
H. Salazar, G. Li, C.C. Liu, and F. N. Okafo, “Transmission Economics for West African 
Power Pool Based on Locational Marginal Prices,” in Proceeding of the 7th International 
Conference on Power System Planning, 2007. ICPSOP 2007, Jan. 22 - Jan. 25 2007 Page(s): 
198 - 202. 
 
G. Li, C.C. Liu, and H. Salazar, “Forecasting Transmission Congestion Using Day - Ahead 
Shadow Prices,” in Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2006. PSCE '06. 2006 IEEE 
PES, Oct. 29 -Nov. 1 2006 Page(s): 1705 - 1709. 
 
H. Salazar, C.C. Liu, and R.F. Chu, “Transmission Rate Design for a Merchant 
Transmission Project,” To be submitted to IEEE Trans. on Power Systems. 
 
H. Salazar, C.C. Liu, and R.F. Chu, “Interaction between Power Plant Investments and 
Transmission Investment: A Conceptual Framework,” To be submitted to IEEE Trans. on 
Power Systems. 
 
Book Chapter 
Y. Hou, H. Salazar, and C.C Liu, Electricity Prices as Stochastic Processes. Advances in 
Electric Power and Energy. Engineering Series of IEEE Press/Wiley. Invited, In preparation.  
 
H. Salazar, R.A. Gallego, and R. Romero, “Artificial Neural Networks and Clustering 
Techniques Applied to the Reconfiguration of Distribution Systems,” IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1735 – 1742, July. 2006. 
 
H. Salazar, R.A. Gallego, and R. Romero, “Clustering Techniques and Neuronal Networks 
applied to the Feeder Reconfiguration Problem” in XIV Brazilian Automation Congress. 
Natal – RN. Brazil. 2002. 
 
H. Salazar, R.A. Gallego, and R. Romero, “Modified Genetic algorithm for Distribution 
Feeder Reconfiguration” in International Conference of Electric and Electronic E3. ACIEM-
IEEE. Bogotá. Colombia. 2001.  
 
H. Salazar, R.A. Gallego, and R. Romero, “Distribution Feeder Reconfiguration using 
Neuronal Networks” in International Conference of Electric and Electronic E3. ACIEM - 
IEEE. Bogotá. Colombia. 2001. 
 
 
 94 
H. Salazar, and A. Alzate, “Optimization of an Adaptive Inference System (ANFIS) using 
Genetic Algorithms” in International Conference on Engineering Systems, Communication 
and Information Technologies. ICESIT. Punta Arenas. Chile. 2001. 
 
H. Salazar, and A. Alzate, “Power System Oscillation Control using an Adaptive Inference 
System” in International Conference on Engineering Systems, Communication and 
Information Technologies. ICESIT. Punta Arenas. Chile. 2001. 
 
H. Salazar, and A. Alzate, “Tuning an Adaptive Inference System (ANFIS) using Genetic 
Algorithms”. Stientia et Technica. Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira, vol. 5, no. 1, 2001.  
 
Book 
H. Salazar, R.A. Gallego, and A. Escobar, Análisis de Sistemas de Potencia. 1ª Edición. 
Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira, 2003. 
 
